


Northern Black Sea and Russia Ports Threat Assessment

Port operations and security overview

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Overview of current situation

Brief update:

During the past week, there have been no incidents recorded and no significant change to the overall security picture, in relation to maritime operations in the Black Sea. Reports continue to indicate Russian targeting of Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, throughout the country. The southern and the eastern regions of Ukraine remain the focus of Russian and Ukrainian forces.

The recent reports of intensified aerial bombardment by Russian forces, particularly on Ukrainian infrastructure, does signify an overall intensification of such attacks, which in turn can increase the likelihood of collateral damage, but the intensification should be seen in the context of the ongoing security situation, where such aerial bombardments have been occurring on and off for most of the war. Although the intensity of the Russian aerial bombardment may vary, the current circumstances are likely to continue in the coming week, as there are no apparent or foreseeable changes to the current situation, neither militarily nor politically or diplomatically. Overall, therefore, there is no change to the present threat picture towards maritime operations in the region.

Ukrainian 'Humanitarian Corridor'

For the past week the Ukrainian 'humanitarian corridor' remains operational, with no changes in the threat picture for the corridor or the ports connected to it. 430 vessels are reported to have transported more than 13million tons of cargo, since August 2023.

Drone and cruise missile paths are known to cross the corridor, and while direct targeting is unlikely, collateral damage from malfunctioning or downed drones and missiles cannot be ruled out.

Russian tactics related to the NW Black Sea and attempts to disrupt any scheduled flow of vessels transiting to Ukrainian Black Sea ports, is still assessed as likely to occur. This may include harassment of vessels, as well as firing warning shots. Such incidents are deemed more likely south of 45-21N and in international waters.

Until some kind of firm security guarantees address the threat of Russian forced inspections of vessels trading in Ukrainian Black Sea and Danube ports, such incidents are assessed to be possible. It should therefore be assumed that there remains an increased threat towards maritime trade in the NW Black Sea and near the conflict area, in particular.

North of 45-21N, Russia may in the worst-case scenario, sink merchant vessels. While this is unlikely, especially due to international condemnation in such a case would be widespread.

Although attacks against Russian Naval capabilities have been reported from time to time, Russia still maintains a strong presence in the Black Sea. However, under current circumstances, it is unlikely that Russian Naval capabilities can uphold any blockade or strict inspection regime, especially with Ukrainian anti-ship capabilities in place throughout the region. Any overt rhetoric of threats in the area, real or not, are still assessed as a likely attempts to influence threat perception and willingness to undertake voyages into the corridor north of 45-21 in particular, as well as in the wider Black Sea.

The threat of drifting mines remains a serious concern as the 27 December 2023 incident involving the bulk-carrier VYSSOS, showed. Russia has extensive capabilities to covertly release mines or other munitions into the corridor, using submarines. This would allow for plausible deniability, and the argument that the damage was done by Ukrainian mines. The use of submarines will likely also be influenced by the risk to surface vessels due to Ukrainian anti-ship capabilities.

The coordinated insurance mechanism between Ukraine and a syndicate of United Kingdom marine insurers is intended to reduce the war-risk premiums when transiting to Ukrainian Black Sea ports of Odessa, Chornomorsk and Pivdenny and Ukrainian Danube ports.

Black Sea:

There were no developments during the past week that changed the current threat picture in the Black Sea. Local weather conditions are known to impact operating in the north-western Black Sea and stormy weather in November and December did raise concerns about how this might impact on the drifting mines, as the weather is likely to dislodge more mines from their moorings or disperse already drifting mines, over a greater area. Russian forces continued to target general Ukrainian infrastructure and Ukrainian forces continued to push toward achieving strategic and military objectives.

Ukrainian forces are likely to continue the pressure on the Crimean Peninsula and likely to continue the focus of gaining more firm control of the maritime domain. This will likely continue to be a key priority for them, as this will provide more definite security circumstances for any future shipping corridor to

Ukrainian Black Sea ports. Russian forces are likely to continue to focus on countering the Ukrainian efforts.

A chart of the announced 'humanitarian corridor', as published in the Annex to the IMO Circular Letter No.4748, can be found in Annex 2 of this report.

Although generally assessed as less likely, Ukrainian forces may target cargo vessels operated by, or sailing for, the Russian military. Examples of this have included oil tankers escorted by Russian naval vessels at sea and near the Kerch Strait. However, Ukraine is very unlikely to target regular civilian shipping, although collateral damage near Russian ports and infrastructure is possible.

Attacks on Ukrainian ports and their associated cities are known to previously have affected the port power supply, which in turn has halted operations. Given the constant unpredictability, similar future disruption cannot be ruled out. The threat from military operations, particularly in the NW area, but also the wider Black Sea area, is still considered severe. This includes the continued threat of reported sea-mines in the Black Sea and various military operations and engagements in the NW Black Sea which have become more common after the Russian withdrawal from the BSGI. This includes frequent reports of the movement of UKR naval drones and special forces, and Russian assets patrolling to counter these movements. Additional details about recent incidents can be found at the back of this report.

The Ukrainian military continues to launch operations targeting Russian forces in the south and east of Ukraine including in occupied Crimea – indicating a likely intention to increase control of the area.

The Ukrainian air-raid alerts also occur in the south-eastern region of Odessa and Odessa city has also recently been targeted by Russian attacks, although the port is not known to have been targeted during the recent attacks. However, there is a continued high likelihood of collateral damage to vessels in Ukrainian Danube ports.

Although Bulgaria and Romania are understood to be undertaking counter-mine activities, it remains unclear the extent to which these operate and reports of drifting naval mines at sea, and mine disposals on or near Black Sea coasts continues. Further minesweeping capabilities, are reportedly awaiting access to the Black Sea. As noted earlier in this report, the local weather conditions raise the concerns for drifting mines. While a connection to the war is likely, exact origins of individual mines are uncertain. There is also doubt about the potential number of mines deployed in the Black Sea, but the sightings and ongoing efforts of

disposals, highlight that mines are a threat. Storms in the area often lead to new sightings as mines become untethered from anchors and begin to drift.

The current threat picture for the whole Black Sea remains strongly influenced by both Russian and Ukrainian efforts to assert control and affect shipping. Conflict related implications when operating in the Black Sea are therefore likely to continue – with continued increased naval presence and activity, congestion and delays when transiting the regional straits and rivers, congestion at other regional ports due to volume of diverted traffic, impact of sanctions on trade to and from Russia, and complications with crew changes.

Sea of Azov:

The Sea of Azov is still assessed to be limited in access for normal commercial maritime traffic.

The Ukrainian Sea of Azov ports (Mariupol and Berdyansk) are still controlled and operated by the Russian military and occupation authorities. While the Russians have previously announced the ports to be open and being rebuilt – with recent claims of increased traffic – the actual operational state is unclear. Vessels given access into these ports are known to have transported stolen Ukrainian cargo, most notably steel and metal products, as well as grain. Naval movements into the ports are likely to occur. Incidents of long-range attacks and sabotage in both cities are known, but unverified.

The Ukrainian authorities have stated that they are monitoring vessels going to occupied Ukrainian ports, in the Sea of Azov, and that these vessels are viewed as legitimate military targets.

Traffic is known to be halted on the Kerch Strait bridge, a coveted target by Ukrainian military, as the recent 26 December incident showed, and similar situations are likely to occur again in the event of a future attacks or likelihood thereof. Russia has announced that vessels which have loaded anywhere outside of Russia, will not be permitted to pass through the Kerch Strait. Disruption and delays to transits of non-Russian-flagged vessels are known to occur. Direct targeting of Russian (proper) ports, port cities, or nearby areas is generally considered unlikely, although the potential targeting of Russian Black Sea ports is assessed to be more likely. Russian Black Sea ports are understood to be operating at ISPS level 2.

BSGI: Black Sea Grain Initiative

BSGI remains suspended and is unlikely to be revived. As noted in a previous report, on 17 December, Russia expressed no interest in returning

to the previous UN-backed Black Sea Grain Initiative. The decision to withdraw was reported as a political one, and that Russia continued to export its own grain to its own buyers. This further strengthens the commitment to work towards a more permanent establishment of the Ukrainian 'humanitarian corridor'.

The announced agreement between Ukraine and United Kingdom based insurers, the Ukrainian 'humanitarian corridor', also strengthens the future of the corridor – though it should still not be seen as direct replacement of the BSGI. The corridor has, since the first vessel departed in mid-September, been used for various shipments mostly grain but also metal materials. The corridor is still understood as a temporary maritime route in the north-western part of the Black Sea, with a stated focus on evacuating ships stuck in the Ukrainian ports. Exporting additional Ukraine agricultural produce via the land-routes – such as Poland, Bulgaria, Romania or expanding the current capacity of the Danube continues to be explored as well as any other possible means.

Information regarding past vessel movements and goods transported, as part of the BSGI, can be found on the UN dedicated website below¹.

<https://www.un.org/en/black-sea-grain-initiative/vessel-movements>

Ukraine:

Port information is located in the port table.

Local weather conditions are likely to continue to impact both maritime and military operations. Similar to previous weeks reports, options to increase the security for a future Ukrainian Black Sea export corridor are still understood to be explored – both in terms of funding but also additional military equipment. Although Ukrainian ports remain shut for normal operations, Odessa, Pivdennyi (formerly Yuzhny) and Chornomorsk, are handling operations connected to Ukrainian 'humanitarian corridor'. Any specific impact of reported attacks on Ukrainian Black Sea and Danube port infrastructure, following individual incidents, is uncertain, though targeting is likely to continue to complicate operations to varying degrees.

Ukrainian Danube ports are reported open and operating, although it is understood that an ongoing shortage of pilots and local weather conditions does cause operational disruption and delays. Future Russian attacks targeting the Ukrainian

Danube ports are likely. Attacks targeting Ukrainian Danube port infrastructure has been occurring since the closing of the BSGI, with Russia significantly intensifying drone attacks against the Ukrainian logistics infrastructure near the river. Attacks at night are common, and anti-air defenses in and near the ports often work through the night against Russian drone attacks. Collateral damage to vessels in the ports is possible – either from strikes on the ports, or vessels may be hit by stray or disabled drones.

Russian long-range missile and drone attacks against critical infrastructure, are likely to continue. Russian forces are also likely to increasingly bomb heating and power infrastructure in Ukraine, to put maximum pressure on Ukrainian society, during the winter. Ukrainian authorities claim to be better prepared, compared to last year, but this will likely be a potential issue for future port operations. For example, in the case of targeting of power and electricity infrastructure may cause power failures.

In case of a dramatic change on the ground, Russia may limit the strategic bombing and use the long-range precision weapons and drones against military targets closer to the front-line.

It is assessed that although grain exports play an important role in funding Ukraine's war effort – and will no doubt continue to do so – any future shipping corridor will likely also be important for importing building-materials for the future rebuilding of the country.

Any future call by the Ukrainian government for additional mobilization of citizens to the armed forces is likely to exempt Ukrainian seafarers although the scale of such a mobilisation is uncertain.

The main efforts of the Ukrainian offensive are still understood to be concentrating in the south and east. In case of a wider breakthrough in Kherson and/or Zaporizhzhia Oblasts towards Crimea and the Azov Sea, Russian priorities regarding operating the ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol may change.

Martial law was extended for 90 days, from 16 November 2023 until 14 February 2024 – with some local night-time curfews in place. All Ukrainian ports are operating at ISPS level 3 in accordance with the communication to the IMO by the Ukrainian authorities.

¹ Risk Intelligence is not responsible for third party content.

Russia:

Port information is located in the port table.

Russia introduced a temporary restriction on Ukrainian citizens, which may impact any vessels with Ukrainian crew, going to Russian ports. The Ukrainian effort to continue to attack Crimea and the Kerch Strait, is likely to have exerted a great deal of pressure against the Russian Navy in the NW Black Sea. Especially attacks on Sevastopol, the historic homeport of the Black Sea Fleet, seems to have had a significant effect, as the Russian navy are reported to have retreated from the port and moved its remaining vessels to Novorossiysk further east. This could give the Ukrainian military more freedom to operate in the NW Black Sea, although Russian aviation and other strike capabilities remain in the area.

The Ukrainian intent to strike at, and the availability of capabilities, to reach Russian targets highlight that the immediate threat towards Russian Black Sea ports has to be taken into account. With the moving of the Russian Black Sea Navy, Ukraine is likely to focus more on strikes to the East of the Black Sea, and ports in this area.

While intended targeting of civilian vessels is still assessed as unlikely, collateral damage or mistaken targeting is possible, by both parties – including a Ukrainian willingness to attack “civilian” cargo vessels operated by the Russian military – such vessels are often sanctioned due to activities related to the Syrian Civil War and the transport of military equipment.

It is uncertain to what degree countermeasures and security will impact operations in Russian ports. However, reports indicate that the Russian authorities have raised security concerns over the fear of UKR naval drones. An example is the port of Feodosia near Kerch, where there now is a ban on entering the waters closer than 1km of the port in small vessels and crafts. This adds to previous reports of gunfire in Feodosia and various reports of drone sightings, which are known to result in the closure of the Kerch Strait Bridge. The actual presence or sightings of drones are uncertain.

Overall, because of the threat to Russian ports, and the increased security, there is a chance that guards and troops will be overly nervous or paranoid about attacks and security incidents. The hyper-vigilant state can lead security personnel to perceive benign actions or individuals as potential threats, thus increasing the likelihood of unjustified use of force – this extends to sailors and vessels.

There are also known reports of Russia sinking some old ferries or similar in the Kerch Strait, as an attempt to create a bulwark against the Ukrainian

naval drones. While this most likely won't affect the regular shipping lane underneath the bridge, it highlights that Russia are stepping up security and are taking the threat of Ukrainian drones extremely seriously.

Extra scrutiny against crew, and passengers from the West in Russian ports, has previously occurred. Extra focus is expected against Ukrainian crewmembers, who are required to be brought ashore and questioned by Russian authorities before berthing. Some crews on merchant vessels in the Black Sea, are known to have been questioned on attitude towards Russia and the invasion of Ukraine. Content on phones and electronic devices, as well as messages on social media and other text services may be investigated to establish anti-Russian sentiment.

Reports of activism against vessels transporting cargo to or from Russia are known. This is predominately when vessels with Russian cargo call European or western ports. Similarly, there have been previous incidents of vessels carrying oil and gas products from Russia being targeted by environmental/peace activists at sea or while underway as recently illustrated by the cruise ship calling at Batumi. Port workers and industrial action in the form of refusal to service the vessels once it lands in Western ports, is also likely. Hacktivists targeting companies trading with Russia cannot be ruled out.

Outlook:

Although Russia has intensified its aerial bombardment of Ukrainian cities and civilian infrastructure, the current and immediate outlook for the security situation in the Black Sea region remains unchanged. Ukrainian focus, both politically, in terms of securing further global political support, and funds to sustain its war efforts, but also militarily to attaining more control of security in the maritime domain, will likely continue to be key priorities.

Regional weather conditions are known to impact both maritime and military operations. Although both commercial maritime and military operations have been impacted, it is assessed that the military operations will attempt to shift tactics, to more weather appropriate, in order to keep the up whatever momentum is possible.

Reported military operations continue to underline the general current threat picture, which is assessed to remain the same for the coming week – with the additional caveat that unknown events may unfold. Any significant changes to the present circumstances are not assessed as likely. Russian targeting of Ukrainian infrastructure, including port

facilities, is likely to continue to varying degrees – throughout the country. Russia is likely to continue to attempt to disrupt the vessels transiting the Ukrainian ‘humanitarian corridor’, although such attempts are also likely to distract the Ukrainian military from their own operations in the NW Black Sea – which continues to indicate an increased focus on establishing area control. Russian efforts to counter the Ukrainian offensive operations are still likely to be stepped up, possibly by increased targeting of civilian infrastructure.

Although the announced agreement between Ukraine and a United Kingdom based insurance syndicate, is a positive development both for shipping but also for general exports and production within Ukraine, such an insurance mechanism does not, in isolation, change the actual threat picture. The volatility in relation to operating in the Black Sea is unlikely to change, as both Ukraine and Russia will attempt to assert dominance and disrupt the activities of the other side as much as possible.

Given the likely continued focus by the Russian military to target Ukrainian port cities and facilities, to keep the pressure on Ukrainian abilities to export their goods – and if the disruption of port operations, due to the shelling, is not considered to be effective enough, additional intensity or other tactics, such as forced inspections or direct attacks on merchant vessels, may become more likely, as it seems the ultimate goal of the Russian efforts are to deny Ukraine the income from their exports. Any tacit agreement from the Russians on transits is unlikely unless outside pressure or negotiated separately.

Ukrainian strikes are likely to continue against Russian logistics infrastructure and storage sites to disrupt Russian supply-lines and military operations in Southern Ukraine. Much of this can be focused on the Sea of Azov and Crimea, and future major attacks against maritime infrastructure to keep the pressure on Russian supply-lines the area, are likely.

Although the Russian authorities appear to rule out any future “official” mobilization of Russian citizens, other means are being utilized, such as the legislative changes, or other means in attempts to achieve the same conscription goals.

Future sanctions towards Russia may affect the overall security dynamics of the Black Sea. If further sanctions mount, Russia could still respond by restricting Russian ports for vessels affiliated with or connected to EU/NATO/Western countries or flags. In such a scenario, any effect on vessels in Russian ports is uncertain, although detention of vessels could be a possibility – threats of this have been reported. Russian authorities might do

extensive checks and controls of western vessels as a form of harassment.

The war in Ukraine has proven it can take on additional dimensions – with the likely example of the sabotage of the Nord Stream 1 and 2 pipelines in the Baltic Sea, in late September 2022 – this means that additional hybrid-warfare means may be used not just in relation to Ukraine and the Black Sea, but also elsewhere in the world- especially where the international tensions between Russia and the West/NATO are prevalent. These may include, but are not limited to, harassment, espionage, cyberattacks, and sabotage of and against maritime assets and infrastructure. This has the potential to affect maritime security in a negative way.

Annex 1 – Illustration of reported mined areas

Annex 2 – Announced temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports

Annex 3 – Reported Kerch Strait inspection area

Annex 4 – Incidents

Ukraine and northern Black Sea ports

Refer to the following page for definitions and information on sanctions/commercial restrictions

Port	Current port situation	Current local situation	Operations	Security
Odessa	Regular cargo operations understood suspended for commercial operations, but operations related to the unilateral UKR corridor are known.	Russian strikes do occur against targets in the Odessa Oblast, including some direct targeting of Odessa city and port facilities. Further targeting and increased focus as part of military operations cannot be ruled out.		
Pivdenny	Regular cargo operations understood suspended for commercial operations, but operations related to the unilateral UKR corridor are known.	Located in the Odessa Oblast where Russian strikes have taken place, including in the nearby city of Yuzhny. Further targeting in the area and increased focus as part of military operations cannot be ruled out.		
Mykolaiv	Closed. Cargo operations suspended for commercial operations.	In control of Ukrainian forces, but strikes and shelling, by Russian forces, of targets in or near the city, has been reported.		
Mariupol	Disputed operational status.	Controlled by Russian forces and part of annexed territory. Actual operational status is disputed with Russian authorities reporting the port to be open, although this is with very limited traffic prioritized by the Russian state. Reports indicate rebuilding of the port facilities by Russian military and contractors.		
Chornomorsk	Regular cargo operations understood suspended for commercial operations, but operations related to the unilateral UKR corridor are known.	Russian strikes have occurred against targets in the Odessa Oblast. Further targeting in the area and increased focus as part of military operations cannot be ruled out.		
Ukraine Danube ports	Ukraine Danube ports are understood operating and handling ship calls via the Danube, and the Sulina and Bystre Canals.	<p>Incidents involving mines have occurred in the Black Sea near the canals. Russian strikes do occur against the port of Reni and Izmail. Previous incidents indicate a Russian priority of targeting the logistics infrastructure on or near the Danube, including port infrastructure. Collateral damage to vessels is possible. Local weather conditions and pilot shortages also impact maritime operations.</p> <p>ISPS Level 3 is in place, as communicated by the Ukrainian authorities. Delays and congestion have been reported in relation to port and canal operations.</p>		

Port	Current port situation	Current local situation	Operations	Security
Kerch Strait	Open for navigation within but closed for unauthorised transit. Ports located within the Strait are reported to be operating. Inspection regime and additional security measures are in place.	UKR naval drone or missile strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge and nearby naval installations do occur. Attacks are less likely to directly target commercial maritime traffic, although collateral damage cannot be ruled out, with Ukrainian authorities reiterating the threat towards vessels carrying military related equipment to Ukrainian Azov ports Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones or cruise missiles, is possible. Russia has announced transit restriction of vessels which are not loaded in Russian ports. Scrutiny against crew is possible *. See Annex 3 for reported Kerch Strait inspection area.		
Russian Black Sea ports	Open with restrictions. Additional security measures are in place.	Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Collateral damage to vessels may occur in case of incidents. Scrutiny against crew is possible *. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones or cruise missiles, is possible.		
Russian Sea of Azov ports	Open with restrictions. Sea of Azov is currently closed to unauthorized navigation by the Russian authorities. Additional security measures are in place.	Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Collateral damage to vessels may occur in case of incidents. Scrutiny against crew is possible *. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones or cruise missiles, is possible.		
Temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports	Operational status is reported to be open – though influenced by operational circumstances in the NW Black Sea.	Operational, but transits are believed to be on a case-by-case basis. Sources indicate limited UKR escorts in the form of RHIBs. Any tacit agreement from Russia on current transits are unknown, and further Russian acceptance is unclear if the increased tempo of Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in the Black Sea continues. Military activity in and near the corridor is possible.		
Constanta	Open.	Operating, with additional cargo diverted to Constanta due to closed Ukrainian ports. Congestion should be expected, and although this is being managed, it could lead to delays.		

* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts. ** Risk Intelligence is not responsible for third party content.

Operations and Security definitions

Operations:

Green – Operations in the area are ongoing normally with no significant issues.

Yellow – Some delays or disruptions in the area may be expected, which could be due to limitations to, for example, port operations and/or congestion in the area, or other difficulties with access or operating at the required ISPS level or complying with other procedures either at port or offshore.

Red – Operations have been significantly disrupted and ports or areas might be closed or only partially operating due to restrictions, blockades, lack of functioning infrastructure, personnel disruptions, and access concerns, or other issues preventing all or most operations.

Security:

Green – The area is secure and there are no direct or indirect security threats in the port vicinity or offshore area. Low threat to vessels/personnel.

Yellow – There are no direct security threats but there are possible indirect threats in the vicinity, particularly but not limited to conflict taking place in proximity either on land or offshore. Moderate threat to vessels/personnel.

Red – Direct threats are possible to the port or area and/or its immediate approaches, including collateral damage in the immediate area or direct attacks that could target infrastructure and vessels at berth/anchorages/underway. High threat to vessels/personnel.

Note on sanctions and commercial restrictions

Sanctions and commercial restrictions are being imposed on Russia in response to its invasion. These sanctions are evolving and will affect ongoing business operations in many complex legal ways. Sanctions are being applied to individual Russians, business entities, and to certain Russian export products (such as oil products). There are also restrictions on specific nationalities (such as US citizens) engaging in certain activities, restrictions on payments (in certain currencies and through certain institutions), and restrictions on Russia's import of particular dual-use items and technologies. Port entry bans for Russian vessels are being implemented (in the UK, for example).


The fine print of sanctions and restrictions might affect chartering arrangements in unexpected ways, depending on the connection to Russia. These issues, as well as insurance issues for operating in war risk areas, are not covered in this report and might need to be assessed separately to reduce the risk of exposure.

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Annex 1:

Reported mined areas




Risk Intelligence (Illustration for visual guidance only)

NAVAREA III: See above for visual guidance on mined areas according to the Spanish flag administration (NAVAREA III 0092).

Mined areas are most likely a combination of deeper sea mines and shallow water mines for anti-amphibious operations as well as on beaches. Mines in the sea are most likely cabled or anchored and under control.

Please also note that active NAVAREA III warnings include a warning of possible drifting mines (NAVAREA III 0122) for Northwest, West, and Southwest areas of the Black Sea.


Annex 2:



The above chart shows the announced temporary routes for civilian vessels to and from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. The Ukrainian Navy emphasizes that war risks, including mines, remain. Further details can be found in the IMO Circular Letter No.4748 (Source: IMO Illustration for visual guidance only)

Annex 3:

Reported Kerch Strait inspection area, as announced by the Russian authorities 02 August 2023.



No maritime related incidents were recorded during the past reporting period.