



**RiskIntelligence**

# Security Threat Update: Red Sea / Gulf of Aden

12 June 2024

Risk Intelligence A/S  
Strandvejen 100  
2900 Hellerup  
Denmark

Tel: +45 7026 6230  
[info@riskintelligence.eu](mailto:info@riskintelligence.eu)  
[www.riskintelligence.eu](http://www.riskintelligence.eu)

# Table of contents

- Recent incidents (Red Sea / Gulf of Aden) .....4**
- Current situation .....5**
- Guidance on commercial operations.....11**
- Red Sea – threat assessment (summary) .....13**
  - Threat levels..... 14
- Indian Ocean – threat assessment (summary).....15**
  - Threat levels..... 16
- Methodology / Definitions .....17**

## Security Threat Update: Red Sea / Gulf of Aden

This report provides an overview of recent incidents in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden as well as an assessments of threat levels for additional attacks against different types of merchant vessels.

Time of latest intelligence included in this report: 12 June 2024, 08:00 UTC.

Advice given and recommendations made do not constitute a warranty of future results by Risk Intelligence or an assurance against risk. Recommendations made are based on information available at the time of writing. No express or implied warranty is given in respect of any judgment made or to changes or any unforeseen escalation of any factors affecting any such judgement.

Documents are for the benefit of the client only and may not be disclosed to any third parties without the prior written consent of Risk Intelligence; such consent not to be withheld unreasonably. The client agrees to indemnify Risk Intelligence against any claims and any resulting damages that may be caused by any unauthorised disclosure of such documents.

## Recent incidents (Red Sea / Gulf of Aden)

Below is a list of incidents directly affecting merchant ships in the Red Sea, the Bab el Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden which have been recorded on the Risk Intelligence System during the past 30 days. Information includes date, time and a short description of the respective incident. Comprehensive descriptions for these and older incidents can be found on the Risk Intelligence System.

<b>17 May</b>	<b>22:00 UTC</b>	<b>Crude oil tanker WIND struck by missile</b>
The Panama-flagged tanker sustained slight damage after being struck by a missile. The vessel lost and regained propulsion and continued the voyage.		
<b>23 May</b>	<b>04:35 UTC</b>	<b>Bulk carrier YANNIS targeted by missiles</b>
The Malta-flagged bulk carrier reported a suspected missile or drone impact in close proximity to the ship's port side.		
<b>28 May</b>	<b>09:30 UTC</b>	<b>Bulk carrier LAAX struck by missile</b>
The Marshall Islands-flagged ship was repeatedly targeted by missiles and struck at least once, but the vessel was able to proceed to the next port of call.		
<b>6 June</b>	<b>18:06 UTC</b>	<b>General cargo ship AAL GENOA reports nearby explosions</b>
The ship reported several explosions in close proximity during a southbound transit in the southern Red Sea.		
<b>8/9 June</b>	<b>20:00/17:30 UTC</b>	<b>General cargo ship NORDERNEY targeted twice</b>
The ship was targeted twice during a westbound transit through the Gulf of Aden; projectiles hit the ship during both incidents.		
<b>9 June</b>	<b>02:39 UTC</b>	<b>Container ship MSC TAVVISHI struck</b>
The Liberia-flagged ship was struck by an unknown projectile during an eastbound transit through the Gulf of Aden after leaving the port of Djibouti.		

## Current situation

- US forces reportedly continued their targeting of missile and drone launch sites in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. Naval vessels from several countries also continued interceptions of aerial drones and missiles over the Red Sea.
- Attacks have slowed down within the habitual Houthi strike zone in the Southern Red Sea, west and northwest of Hudaydah, although they still continue.
- Rumours as to the “cooperation” between the Houthis and the Al-Shabab continue to spread. While these reflect long-standing links between both sides of the Gulf of Aden, the veracity and depth of the claimed links remain to be verified.

Military strikes against targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen have been conducted since January. Strikes have been carried out unilaterally by US forces and as joint strikes with the UK military, supported by Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand. They are conducted under Operation Poseidon Archer. For political reasons, offensive actions are separate from the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian which is merely aimed at protecting commercial shipping.

Since the beginning of the Houthi campaign in November, the US and other governments have frequently stated that Houthi attacks against merchant ships have been 'indiscriminate'. This conclusion, however, has never been supported by available evidence. Houthi forces have publicly stated their targeting parameters and stuck to these announcements. Some attacks, however, were very likely carried out based on outdated information about individual ships.

Analysing all incidents since November and considering military strikes against the Houthis, the threat to merchant ships is closely linked to individual characteristics. This is broadly in line with the Houthis' announcements and their previous actions.

Houthi forces are very likely to continue selecting specific targets rather than widen their campaign to indiscriminate attacks against civilian shipping. It is possible, however, that they will widen their campaign to an extent to assert pressure on southern Yemen and to limit port calls in that part of the country, notably in Aden.

This week, rumours of a potential collaboration between the Houthis and the Somali Shabaab again emerged. Various sources have reported, with varying degrees of credibility, that the Houthis had engaged in collaboration with the Shabaab, notably for smuggling guns across the Gulf. There have likewise been rumours that both actors have coordinated actions so as to maximise disruption to maritime traffic.

There is no indication available to Risk Intelligence that the Houthis and the Shabaab have coordinated actions in recent months. While such an evolution is theoretically possible, neither group has a particular interest in doing so. The Houthis' goal is not to disrupt traffic *per se*, but as part of a demonstration of power with clear political benefits in mind. Likewise, the Shabaab has been conducting its insurrection mostly south of the Somali coasts on the Gulf of Aden, and has never had a strong maritime component to their activities. The Shabaab are present along the

northern coasts, but they are not assessed to be in direct command of pirate action groups, which a Houthi-Shabaab cooperation would entail. Furthermore, the Shabaab likely have little interest in attracting more attention from international military forces, as they seek to consolidate their domestic rule. The benefit in such a cooperation would therefore be limited for both sides. That local pirate groups in Somalia have dealings with the Shabaab or pay a tithe to the group is entirely possible, given the Shabaab's proximity to but that is not information available to Risk Intelligence at the time of writing.

It should be noted that Yemen and Somalia share deep cultural, linguistic and economic ties. Both areas have long been connected, and trade between both countries is still lively. There is intense local traffic between both countries, covering both licit goods (meat, fuel) and illicit goods (drugs, weapons), which mostly occurs outside of official purview.

Bosaso plays a particular role in this relation, given its status as regional trade and smuggling hub. Goods imported to Yemen often transit through Bosaso, which is also known for its central role in regional arms smuggling. It is not impossible that smuggling and trade networks exist between Houthi-controlled territories and Bosaso, where the Shabaab maintain only a weak presence and are not in control. Much of the speculation is likely attributable to the fact that Iranian weapons irrigate both Somalia and Yemen, and in at least some cases share similar origins. This does not constitute a sufficient base to claim that the Houthis and the Shabaab are cooperating.

Vessel type	Threat type	Threat level
Vessels specifically linked to Israel through ownership, port calls, trade with and/or commercial relationship between Israeli companies and owners/operators	Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	<b>Severe</b>
Vessels linked to the United States, United Kingdom and other countries involved in Operation Poseidon Archer	Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	<b>Severe</b>
Vessels linked to other countries participating in or supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Aspides	Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	<b>Elevated</b>
Other merchant ships in transit through the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden	Kinetic attack due to misidentification, potential proximity to the above threats ('collateral damage')	<b>Elevated</b>

Overall, the threat level to vessels directly owned by Israeli companies has been severe since the beginning of the Houthi campaign. Such vessels therefore largely stopped transiting the Red Sea, leading the Houthis to expand their potential targets to vessels trading with Israel. As mentioned above, some attacks were very likely carried out based on outdated information in publicly available databases, underlining the threat level for collateral damage.

Military under Prosperity Guardian and Poseidon archer have led to an expansion of the Houthis' target pool which now includes merchant ships linked to both countries. This has resulted in a severe threat level for vessels directly linked to these operations, highlighted by several attacks.

The Houthis have now broadened the scope of acceptable targets to any vessel belonging to companies trading in Israel, regardless of whether the specific vessel has called Israeli ports.

Despite the slower pace of attacks than in the start of the campaign, Houthi forces remain capable of conducting attacks. In addition, these are not limited to the southern Red Sea where Houthi forces control a large portion of coastline. Several ships have also been struck in the Gulf of Aden.

Gradual degrading of the Houthis' missile launch capability may lead to an increase in the use of lower-level technology tactics such as firing rockets from skiffs or launching naval and aerial drones. However, the actual impact of military strikes on Houthi capabilities cannot be assessed. Reports about strikes are solely based on military sources and not independently verified.

Any meaningful and sustainable reduction of the threat posed by the Houthis would very likely require a longer-term mission. The current casualty-averse approach limits greater damage to Houthi weapons stockpiles. At the same time, a shift in tactics would likely have a greater civilian impact on the ground, potentially provoking another escalation in maritime attacks.

For merchant ships linked to countries solely supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Aspides which both have a defensive focus, the threat level is assessed as lower compared to countries participating in offensive military actions against Houthi forces. For all other commercial vessels, the same threat level applies.

For vessels related to countries taking part in Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Aspides, this is largely due to the potential for kinetic attacks in lieu of other potential targets for Houthi forces. However, considering their careful selection of targets – which is in line with broader political ambitions – this is currently unlikely.

For vessels not related to countries taking part in Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Aspides, this is largely due to the potential for merchant ships being targeted due to misidentification. Proximity to kinetic attacks or proximity to interceptions of drones and missiles by military forces could also lead to collateral damage.


Finally, it is vital to consider that this remains a dynamic situation. It is strongly recommended to closely monitor the situation. Updates regarding incidents as well as constantly updated assessments of current threat levels are available through the Risk Intelligence System.

## Background

Starting with the seizure of the GALAXY LEADER on 19 November, Risk Intelligence has identified more than 60 targeted attacks by Houthi forces against individual vessels in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. This is slightly lower than the number of attacks stated by military sources which are not providing an overview to highlight which incidents were actually classified as 'attacks on commercial vessels'.

Interceptions of drones and missiles are likely counted as additional attacks by military forces, yet there is no further evidence available. Drones and missiles may have been used to target warships or merely used as a "show of force" in at least some of the interceptions.

Looking at all attacks in detail, no preference for attacks against ships in the southern part of the Red Sea or the western part of the Gulf of Aden can be identified. There have been more attacks in the Red Sea, with the difference growing in past weeks. However, it should be noted that attacks in the Gulf of Aden only began in January and that further attacks in that area are possible at any time, underlined by recent incidents.



*Figure 1: Number of attacks against merchant ships passing through the Red Sea/Bab el Mandeb/Gulf of Aden area since November 2023 (Source: Risk Intelligence)*

Houthi attacks against maritime traffic have caused a significant decrease in ship transits through the Bab el Mandeb. It is unlikely that traffic will see a significant further decrease after the current traffic level has remained virtually unchanged since the middle of January, shown in Figure 2.






Figure 2: Number of Bab el Mandeb transits by merchant ships per week, including vessels without broadcasting on AIS (Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

Since January, the number of Bab el Mandeb transits has consistently been between 50% and 60% lower than during the same timeframe in 2023, and the gap has remained relatively constant. Less than 10% of ships passing the Bab el Mandeb are transiting the area with AIS switched off (see Figure 3).




Figure 3: Number of Bab el Mandeb transits by merchant ships per week with and without AIS (Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

It will be important to monitor maritime traffic figures to see if and when commercial vessels are returning to this route in significant numbers. Any sustainable increase is likely to be a drawn-out process and different by ship types, similar to the drop in traffic which was sudden in the container sector but took much longer for bulk carriers as well as tankers (product and crude oil), shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Weekly Bab el Mandeb transits by ship types (Source: Lloyd’s List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

The current threats in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden have also led to a noticeable increase in incidents that are perceived as suspicious by seafarers, including outside the immediate area. Reporting such incidents is strongly encouraged. At the same time, all reports must be thoroughly assessed to identify particular areas of concern.

The background to the current situation is the civil war in Yemen. Since 2015, the Houthis in the northern part of the country have fought against the Saudi and UAE-backed government in southern Yemen. Iran has supported the Houthis during the conflict. Houthi forces have previously targeted Saudi and UAE vessels in the Red Sea with anti-ship missiles and drones (aerial and waterborne). They have also attacked Saudi ports and naval vessels in the Red Sea as well as oil industry targets in southern Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.

The Saudis and the Houthis are involved in difficult negotiations about a peace agreement that would very likely involve financial and economic concessions to the Houthis. Neither side wants to jeopardise a potential deal. Saudi Arabia has refrained from criticising the Houthis which is a noticeable difference from Saudi rhetoric in the past. Moreover, attacks against commercial shipping have not interrupted the negotiations although it is impossible to assess when a final agreement will be signed. Houthi forces are very likely to continue to engage in attacks on maritime traffic as long as they deem their attacks unlikely to scupper the ongoing talks.

# Guidance on commercial operations

## Ship transits

Several shipping industry organisations have published the "Interim Industry Transit Advice, Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden – 5 February 2024". Among other information, the document includes considerations about routing and vessel hardening. Combined Maritime Forces have also issued a guidance document on 23 December 2023.

Both documents are available via [www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org](http://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org).

## Vessel registration and incident reporting

It is strongly recommended for all merchant ships transiting the Western Indian Ocean, the Somali Basin, the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea to register with UKMTO and the Maritime Security Centre - Horn of Africa (MSCHOA). Any incidents or suspicious activities should also be reported to UKMTO and MSCHOA.

### Contact details UKMTO

Email: [watchkeepers@ukmto.org](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.org)

Phone: +44 2393 222060

Website: [www.ukmto.org](http://www.ukmto.org)

### Contact details MSCHOA

Email: [postmaster@mschoa.org](mailto:postmaster@mschoa.org)

Phone: +33 298 220 220 or +33 298 220 170

Website: [www.mschoa.org](http://www.mschoa.org)

If a vessel is under attack, **US naval forces in Bahrain** are able to coordinate assistance.

Phone: +973 1785 3879

Email: [m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil](mailto:m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil)

Combined Maritime Forces also recommend ignoring VHF calls by "Yemeni navy" with instructions to alter course to Hudaydah or other locations in Yemen. When merchant ships are contacted, masters are advised to continue the voyage and call for a coalition warship on VHF Channel 16, stating current location, situation and intentions.

In addition, vessel operators are advised to contact the respective flag state for additional guidance or requirements regarding incident reporting procedures.

## Mitigation measures

Risk Intelligence strongly recommends merchant ship operators to assess whether the respective vessel has been owned or managed by Israel-affiliated companies in the past. Such information may not have been updated in publicly available databases and could lead to misidentification of current commercial links with Israel.

Prior to voyages through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, ship operators should conduct a thorough ship and voyage-specific threat and risk assessment in line with shipping industry best practices. In addition, the following measures should be considered:

- Constant monitoring of the security situation, enabling vessels to avoid locations with recent or ongoing incidents.
- Introduction/update of contingency plans on the company level to address the possibility of seafarers being injured, killed or kidnapped during a security incident. The plan should include contingency and emergency plans; appropriate drills should be completed.
- Crew briefings and scenario drills based on a valid and relevant anti-attack plan to ensure that incidents are reported and alarm is raised without delay when required. Drills should include scenarios with major damage and casualties.
- Enhancement of firefighting, evacuation and damage control procedures, taking into account the possibility of significant damage as a result of direct targeting or collateral damage.
- Enhancement of medical equipment to deal with multiple casualties.
- Emergency contacts placed readily available on the bridge.
- Bridge team briefing regarding hailing/harassment via VHF, prepared responses and immediate contact with naval forces in the respective area. (Local authorities' calls on VHF may be an act of spoofing or even targeting, underlined by several incidents in recent days which involved self-proclaimed 'Yemeni authorities' or the 'Yemeni navy' ordering merchant ships to alter course.)
- Preparation of citadel with emergency provisions and functioning satellite phone.
- Depending on individual circumstances, embarkation of armed guards may be useful to mitigate specific risks, specifically in relation to the threat of boardings from small boats (e.g. Houthi forces, Somali piracy). However, the threat of direct targeting by missiles, aerial or naval drones used by Houthi forces in Yemen (southern Red Sea / Gulf of Aden) cannot be mitigated by embarkation of armed guards.

In general, existing BMP5 recommendations have been developed to deter piracy. While the guidance included in BMP5 is relevant to deter illegal boardings, it offers virtually no mitigation against current threats such as attacks by missiles, drones or – potentially – waterborne IEDs ('drone boats').

Ship operators should also consider to issue specific voyage guidance for transits through the Red Sea and/or the Gulf of Aden. This guidance should consider specific scenarios (e.g. aerial or waterborne threats, hailing on VHF) and include actions by the crew to minimise the impact of any security incident.

## Red Sea – threat assessment (summary)

Following the incidents in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden related primarily to Houthi forces, there is now a significant threat to merchant ships linked to Israel through a variety of commercial relationships. Although threats will vary on a case-by-case basis, the overall threat level for these vessels is now assessed as severe for vessels linked to Israel through ownership and severe for vessels linked through other commercial relationships including port calls.

Threats against vessels linked to the US and UK and other countries involved in direct military strikes against Houthi forces are severe. This reflects the escalation since early January, which has progressively expanded the scope of vessels considered as "legitimate targets" by the Houthis to include any vessels with associations to US, UK or Israeli interests. The threat level for all remainder vessels, those not linked to Israel or nations directly involved in strikes against Houthi forces, is assessed as elevated. It is likely that the US and UK strikes are impacting the Houthis' missile launch capabilities, though the extent of that impact is difficult to assess.

The increased threat is a result of the Israel/Gaza conflict and Houthi actions. Naval vessels have intercepted a number of drones and missiles intended for Israeli targets, or against the naval ships themselves. "Our eyes are open to constantly monitor and search for any Israeli ship in the Red Sea, especially in Bab al-Mandeb, and near Yemeni regional waters," Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi was reported saying in November 2023. On 9 December, a Houthi statement on social media said: "We warn all ships and companies against dealing with Israeli ports". The Houthis have since threatened to strike vessels in the Indian Ocean. However, they are very likely unable to conduct such strikes autonomously.

The situation is evolving as the list of possible targets is expanding. Links to Israel may now be port calls by the respective vessel, owners/operators conducting trade with Israel in general or owners/operators being in commercial relationships with Israeli companies. While the threat level to vessels which are directly owned by Israeli companies is assessed as even higher, it should be noted that virtually no such vessels are currently transiting the Red Sea. Houthi forces have therefore significantly expanded their potential targets, including the categories mentioned above. What the Houthis consider to constitute a link strong enough to warrant a strike is variable and an internal Houthi decision. The Yemeni group has also threatened to strike vessels as far as in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean, although there are significant doubts as to its ability to conduct these strikes without substantial Iranian support.

At the same time, it is important to highlight the increased threat of collateral damage, particularly in the southern Red Sea with dense maritime traffic. It is very likely that Houthi forces have missed their intended targets on several occasions in recent days, increasing the potential for unintended strikes against other merchant ships. Moreover, this is a highly dynamic and evolving threat which must be monitored closely in light of ongoing incidents.

Maritime security in the southern Red Sea is also affected by the conflict in Yemen as some fighting between the Houthis and the rival government supported by the Saudi-led coalition continues. The maritime dimension to this conflict is limited. Ceasefire talks in 2022 saw a substantial fall in cross-border attacks in Saudi Arabia, as well as an improved threat environment during transits through the Bab el Mandeb. Attacks have not taken place in 2023 and so far in

2024, likely due to progress in negotiations between the Houthis and the Saudi-led coalition. Both sides are unlikely to jeopardise a potential deal. The threat level for direct attacks against port and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is therefore lower while talks are ongoing. In addition, Saudi Arabia has so far refrained from criticising the Houthis for the recent wave of attacks against merchant ships which is a significant difference from Saudi announcements about alleged interceptions of waterborne drones off Saudi port facilities in the past.

There is a dispute between Yemen and Eritrea in the Hanish Islands area, primarily due to fishing. In an incident in June 2021, there was a clash between coastguard/naval forces. In August 2021, several fishing vessels and three Yemeni crew were detained by the Eritrean coastguard near the Hanish Islands. Due to the irregular nature of Yemeni coastguard forces, or the difficulty in identifying Eritrean craft (which are small speedboats), there are problems with merchant vessels misidentifying small patrol craft from Yemen and Eritrea as pirate vessels. Aggressive enforcement by coastguard vessels, or local craft attempting to warn away merchant vessels, are possible threats in the area. The piracy threat is minimal, even in southern areas, as this area is now considered to be outside the operational range of Somali pirates. The fighting in Sudan is not expected to affect threat levels in the Red Sea.

**Threat levels**

Refer to the section "Methodology / Definitions" for a detailed definition of the threat level. A concise assessment of all threats listed in the table can be found on the Risk Intelligence System.

Threat type	Threat level
Terrorism	Moderate
Piracy	Low
Insurgency and Military Operations	High
Cargo Theft	Moderate
Smuggling	Elevated
Stowaways and human trafficking	Low
Fraud and corruption	Low
Activism	Low

## Indian Ocean – threat assessment (summary)

This area covers the western Indian Ocean (north of Madagascar, east towards India), including the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, and western Arabian Sea. Houthi operations targeting merchant ships in transit can take place in the western Gulf of Aden where threat levels are similar to the southern Red Sea. In the Indian Ocean, there is an elevated threat of piracy off Somalia and a moderate-elevated drone threat to merchant ships in the Somali Basin, Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.

There is still a potential for pirate operations in the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden and the threat is elevated. Recent cases show that pirates still have boarding capabilities at significant distances off the coast: as far as 800 nautical miles from Somalia but prefer to operate at around 400 nautical miles. The hijacked ABDULLAH was released on 14 April after a claimed \$5 million ransom was paid. The successful ransom has demonstrated that the piracy model still functions – that vessels can be held by pirates off the Somali coast and ransom payments received (refer to the Piracy assessment).

There have also been nine reported boardings of fishing dhows off Somalia since November 2023; there were no cases reported in April 2024, suggesting a decline in activity, but there was one vessel hijacked in May – a fishing vessel held temporarily while the attackers took food and supplies. These are likely linked to illegal fishing activity in the area, which is an ongoing issue and has been a focus for Somalia in expanding its maritime enforcement capabilities.

In general, merchant ships in transit should be aware of the potential to encounter small armed craft in this area, particularly in the Gulf of Aden. These might be fishermen, traders, smugglers, militia or irregular military forces, or military or coastguard patrol craft operating out of southern Yemen or northern Somalia. The boarding of the product tanker CENTRAL PARK in the Gulf of Aden on 26 November 2023 was very likely related to Houthi-led actions against Israel-linked vessels, even though it has been described as a 'piracy incident' by military sources.

The Houthis have announced their intentions to target vessels not just in the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden, but also the Indian Ocean. These intentions have been announced and in some cases communicated directly to operators from the so-called Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC). However, the capabilities of the Houthis to target these areas is limited without outside assistance. Claims of successful strikes in the Indian Ocean (and the eastern Mediterranean) have not been corroborated and are likely to be explained by the Houthi intention to appeal to broader Arab audiences. Nonetheless, the MSC ORION was attacked by a drone on 27 April off Socotra in an attack claimed by the Houthis. The threat is generally assessed to be moderate in this area, as the main area of Houthi operations remains the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden but is elevated for vessels that have been specifically assessed by the Houthis as being targets for their links to Israel – including port calls.

In Yemen, multiple political factions operate their own militias in addition to security forces from Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Terrorist groups have a limited presence. There have been no recent incidents, aside from those linked to Houthi operations. The general situation in Yemen is primarily a consideration for operations close to the Yemeni coast or for port calls in the country.

Naval patrols operate in the area, such as EUNAVFOR's Operation Atalanta. Naval mandates include maritime crimes (such as drugs and arms smuggling) as well as countering piracy. The group transit scheme for the Gulf of Aden is still operational. National deployments are also ongoing, such as the Indian naval presence which has been effective in recent actions.

Shipping industry associations have published transit guidance for the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, emphasising the importance of thorough ship and voyage-specific threat and risk assessments before passing through the area. The shipping industry removed its high-risk area (HRA) designation for the Indian Ocean, effective 1 January 2023, although notes that: "Threat and risk assessments should still be carried out, and best management practices followed to continue to mitigate the risks presented in a changeable and often complex and potentially threatening environment."

UKMTO operates the Voluntary Reporting Area for the Indian Ocean, specifically the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea, administered by the Maritime Trade Information Centre (MTIC)/UKMTO (Dubai). UKMTO acts as point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces in the region. Vessels are encouraged to report their positions while operating in the area. MSCHOA manages the EUNAVFOR (EU Naval Forces Somalia and Operation Atalanta) voluntary registration scheme for vessels transiting the area and administers an interactive website that enables EUNAVFOR to communicate counter-piracy guidance to the maritime industry, and for shipping companies and operators to register vessel movements through the region.

**Threat levels**


Refer to the section "Methodology / Definitions" for a detailed definition of the threat level. Concise assessments of all types of threats listed in the table below can be found on the Risk Intelligence System.

Threat type	Threat level
Terrorism	Moderate
Piracy	Elevated
Insurgency and Military Operations	Moderate
Cargo Theft	Low
Smuggling	Moderate
Stowaways and human trafficking	Low
Fraud and corruption	Low
Activism	Low



## Methodology / Definitions

All threat levels are based on the likelihood of a threat type occurring, with generic consequences described in the relevant sections. All threat levels are based on an assessment of capabilities, intentions and opportunities of potential perpetrators, separated into different categories.



Maritime operators are typically unable to lower the threat level by influencing the underlying variables. However, all variables are subject to change over time, e.g. changes in the intentions or capabilities of potential perpetrators. They should therefore be re-assessed as required.

In an additional step, the threat levels assessed here can be used to identify the risk level for a particular type of operations. Determining the risk level also requires an assessment of the vulnerability and the potential consequence of a particular incident. Appropriate mitigation measures can then be implemented to lower the risk level.

### Threat levels

All threat levels mentioned above are assessed based on the likelihood and consequence of a particular threat type occurring. The levels are:

- Low: Not expected in the operational area or in proximity.
- Moderate: Not expected in the operational area but possible in proximity.
- Elevated: Possible in the operational area or in proximity.
- High: Expected in the operational area or in proximity.
- Severe: Commonplace in the operational area or in proximity.

## RiskIntelligence

Risk Intelligence A/S  
Strandvejen 100  
2900 Hellerup  
Denmark

+45 7026 6230  
riskintelligence.eu