

Joint Maritime Information Center

JMIC Information Note

ATTACK

JMIC# 118

Incident report Ref. UKMTO WARNING INCIDENT 027-25

Bab al-Mandeb

INCIDENT REPORT

Ref. UKMTO Warning Incident 027-25

On July 7th, 2025, the security company officer of the Liberian flagged M/V ETERNITY C (IMO 9588249) reported that the vessel had been approached by multiple small craft firing rocket propelled grenades (RPGs) towards the ship, causing damage to the vessel. Reports indicate injuries, though the severity and extent remain unverified at this stage. This incident is ongoing and has endured over a two-day period.

7 July

- 1) 1634UTC: UKMTO have been informed by vessel EURO SKY (IMO 9546215) that the vessel ETERNITY C has been attacked by multiple small boats with RPGs.
- 2) 1703UTC: The Company Security Officer (CSO) reports the vessel has been attacked by multiple small craft with RPGs.
- 3) 1733UTC: The CSO reports damage to the aft portion of the vessel with crew injured as part of the attack.
- 4) 1759UTC: The CSO reports additional damage and loss of propulsion for ETERNITY C.
- 5) 1832UTC: The CSO reports severe damage to the engine room.

8 July

- 1) 0322UTC: The Master of vessel SEA PUMA (IMO 9469871) observed notable list when passing ETERNITY C.

2) 0350UTC: The Master of SEA PUMA reports VHF communications with ETERNITY C detailing crew member injuries.

Fig 1.



The Liberian-flagged vessel was in ballast, transiting from Somalia to Saudi Arabia. The vessel was not transmitting AIS at the time of the attack.

Due to the ongoing situation and the severity of the attack details regarding injuries and fatalities will not be released at this time.

According to JMIC research, the Owner of M/V ETERNITY C has other vessels which have called in Israel, with the most recent being to Haifa on the 3rd of June 2025.

JMIC GUIDANCE

1. Freedom of navigation and the free flow of maritime commerce continue as a top priority while the Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden.

The current threat assessment identifies:

- a. Vessels with an Israeli, United States or United Kingdom association at highest risk
- b. Any vessel within a Group or Company fleet structure whereby the company has been identified making port calls to Israel

2. Vessels intending to transit the threat area are recommended to exercise caution by applying the following:

- a.** Conduct a threat and risk assessment prior to entering the area including a review of ports calls of other company vessels
- b.** Review security measures/incorporate appropriate vessel hardening measures into their security plans
- c.** Turning off any form of non-essential emissions (e.g. intraship UHF/VHF transmissions) and AIS policy in the vicinity of, or before transiting or entering the threat area is to be very carefully considered as part of the voyage risk mitigation process, as broadcasting on AIS is assessed to aid Houthi targeting
 - i.** While transmitting AIS may be consistent with SOLAS, it may compromise the safety & security of the vessel and crew
 - ii.** If AIS is turned off, consider altering course and speed to minimize tracking by Dead Reckoning
- d.** Do not loiter when transiting the threat area and proceed with caution
- e.** If contacted by any unrecognized organization:
 - i.** Report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
- f.** If contacted on VHF by “Yemeni Navy”:
 - i.** Ignore the VHF call and continue passage if safe to do so
 - ii.** Describe the incident in follow up reports to UKMTO
- g.** Share instances of suspicious activity with UKMTO (with recordings or imagery where possible)
 - i.** UAV sightings
 - ii.** Communications challenges
- h.** In case of unexploded ordnance and debris on deck:
 - i.** Maintain a safe distance (as far away as practically possible) and cordon off the area
 - ii.** Do not touch or try to dismantle any debris
 - iii.** Be aware that any radio emissions may trigger the device
 - iv.** Request assistance through UKMTO, ask for an Explosive Ordnance Disposal Team (EOD)
- i.** Use of Best Management Practices (BMP) should be considered
 - i.** Chain link fencing can be used to reduce the effects of an RPG

Maritime Industry is recommended to:

- a. Conduct a threat & risk assessment of all associated vessels and especially those that may have previous Israel ownership or associations [to include recent port calls by vessels within the company and/or group structure]**

- b.** Companies should plan and implement risk mitigation measures in advance of the furthest identified attack areas as depicted in the JMIC 'Overview of Incidents and Suspicious Activities' slide
- c.** If an association is made, shipping companies are recommended to provide the information to UKMTO prior to transiting the threat area
- d.** Ensure their managed vessels receive and follow the guidance for vessels
- e.** Review digital footprint
- f.** The JMIC is aware of increased email communication between unrecognized reporting entities and owners/operators:
 - i.** If contacted by any organization not officially recognized, report back to your company security officer and validate the source before responding
 - ii.** Any response should be carefully considered
 - iii.** Statements by Houthi forces to encourage merchant shipping to engage with the Houthi's Humanitarian Operations Coordination Centre (HOCC), or Yemeni Navy, should be disregarded and industry best practice and guidance should be followed in close communication with your company's CSO
- g.** Open-source claims that vessels are targeted may not be factual
 - i.** JMIC recommends verifying source for legitimacy.

