



RiskIntelligence

Middle East

Weekly Intelligence Report

9 July 2025

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Middle East Weekly Intelligence Report

This report provides an overview of the current maritime security situation in different parts of the Middle East, notably the southern Red Sea/Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf/Gulf of Oman areas. It is primarily aimed at assessing the threat of attacks against different types of merchant ships operating in these areas.

Due to the current situation across the region, coverage for the report has been expanded from the previous focus on shipping routes along the Yemeni coastline.

Comprehensive descriptions for individual incidents as well as statistics about attacks against merchant ships are available on the Risk Intelligence System.

Time of latest intelligence included in this report: 9 July 2025, 08:00 UTC.

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Current situation

The Houthis conducted the first maritime attack against commercial vessels since December 2024, sinking one vessel and disabling another. As of writing, the incident involving the ETERNITY C is still ongoing. These attacks fit within Houthi targeting parameters and shed light on the Houthis' new tactics, likely adopted in reaction to the latest events in Iran which have directly affected their weapons supply.

Elsewhere in the Middle East, there are no new major developments, as Arab countries and Iran engage in intense diplomacy to navigate a changing region. New political directions are being explored by Iran, whereas much hope is being pinned on the perspectives of Syria beginning its reconstruction. The latest round of ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas has, as expected, collapsed almost immediately after being made public.

US forces have carried out military strikes against targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen between January 2024 and January 2025. An intensified US campaign was then carried out from March to early May 2025. The strikes were conducted both unilaterally and as joint strikes with the UK military, supported by several other countries.

US-coordinated offensive military actions have been conducted under Operation Poseidon Archer. For political reasons, these were separate from the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian which is merely aimed at protecting commercial shipping.

Since the beginning of the Houthi campaign in November 2023, Houthi forces have largely stuck to publicly announced targeting criteria. Some attacks during the early stages of the campaign apparently relied on outdated information about individual ships. Overall, Houthi attacks against merchant ships have not been 'indiscriminate' despite widespread claims by the US and other Western governments.

Red Sea campaign's status

The Houthis' Red Sea campaign which been suspended since 19 January 2025 saw a sudden surge in activity this last week with unusually violent attacks against two merchant ships, the MAGIC SEAS and the ETERNITY C. As of writing the ETERNITY C case is ongoing.

On Sunday 6 July, the MAGIC SEAS was struck by one missile and 4 Unmanned Surface Vessels (USVs, "drone boats"). The embarked security team likewise engaged in a firefight with fighters onboard small skiffs, who fired a Rocket Propelled Grenade (RPG) at the vessel. Following the attack, the crew abandoned ship, and the vessel has sunk by Houthi boarders. The attack against the MAGIC SEAS was in line with previously stated Houthi targeting criteria. The bulk carrier had the same technical manager, commercial manager and beneficial owner as another bulk carrier which had arrived in Ashdod (Israel) on 27 June and was still in the port at the time of the MAGIC SEAS attack.

On Monday 7 July, the ETERNITY C was attacked by multiple small skiffs from which fighters fired RPGs, causing extensive damage to the vessel. The crew has sustained casualties in the attack: at least one crew was severely injured and at least 3 crew have died. As of writing,

ETERNITY C has lost propulsion and the vessel is reported to be listing. Evacuation procedures ongoing. The attack against the ETERNITY C. was in line with previously stated Houthi targeting criteria. The bulk carrier had the same technical manager, commercial manager and beneficial owner as a container ship which had called at Haifa (Israel) in early June and was again en route to Haifa at the time of the ETERNITY C attack. At the time of its attack, the ship had not been broadcasting on AIS, belying claims of increased safety without AIS turned on during transit.

Formally, the ceasefire between US forces and the Houthis announced on 6 May still holds as the vessels are not “American” as per Washington DC’s probable (but unspecified) understanding. At the time on 6 May, in return for a halt of US airstrikes, the Houthis would stop their attacks against US naval forces and “US vessels”. The recent attack again underscores the ineffectiveness of military efforts in preventing the Houthis from conducting attacks.

Motivations for the attacks and their lethality

It is unknown whether this attack signals a wholesale resumption of the campaign as seen in 2024, however some elements allow to infer the intent of the Houthis in mounting such attacks after a 7-month lull. Recent events in Iran are likely to have defined the *modus operandi*, but not the timing of the attack. The timing is probably linked to a combination of external and internal circumstances. Overall, the limited available evidence, outlined below suggests that while further attacks are possible, they are unlikely to return to the scope and frequency of start 2024. This assessment will be voided if the Houthis engage in successive and regular attacks.

In terms of target “validity”, the two vessels clearly fit within the Houthis’ defined targeting parameters. One vessel had called Israel, and another was closely associated to a vessel who had called Israel.

Regarding the timing, the Houthis are almost certainly aware of the passage of the MSC ANTONIA, and the impression it may have given of possible safe passage through the Bab el Mandeb (BAM). An immediately ensuing transit directly to and from Haifa would compromise the Houthi embargo. Elements of the Houthi command chain therefore likely decided that an attack was needed to remind the industry that passage is still under their control.

Internally, the decision to conduct these attacks may also be attributed to tensions among Houthi factions. As in most revolutionary movements, hardline elements are chafing under the perceived “compromissions” made by the leadership over the past year, necessary to conduct affairs in any (semi-)state. Indeed, the “unavenged” US/Israeli attacks on Iran, ceasefires with Saudi as well as the passage of the MSC ANTONIA are all viewed as antithetical to Houthi rhetoric, just as a ceasefire with the US when the Houthis’ slogan explicitly calls for “Death to America” is unlikely to sit well with some. These attacks will have allowed to placate the more radical Houthis.

More bang for your buck

The reason for the violence of the attacks is however more likely linked to logistical practicalities. With Iranian ammunition stocks depleted from the “12-day war” with Israel and its manufacturing capabilities degraded, the Houthis are unlikely to obtain much new ammunition (missiles, drones etc) from Iran within the medium term. This explains the *modus operandi*, which has expended only one missile, and has relied on USVs and RPG, more easily accessible in Yemen without direct Iranian support.

Therefore, the ferocity of the attacks is at least partially linked to the means chosen to compensate for low ammunition reserves. USVs hitting the waterline and fighters planting explosives on bulkers is more likely to sink vessels than drones crashing against bridges.

But the scarcity of ammunition is also likely to have spurred the Houthis to seek more spectacular effects for cheaper. Sinking vessels and killing crew with RPGs and explosives will have a chilling effect on the industry and allows the Houthis to spare themselves the use of the many hundreds of drones and hundred missiles required to enact the embargo in 2024. The highly edited propaganda videos shared afterwards by the Houthis further indicate a desire to maximise the effect of the attack.

Regional evolution

As expected, the ceasefire proposed by the US and Israel was dead on arrival, with the Israeli government prevaricating as per the now-usual script. No immediate change to the situation in Gaza or Israel is expected, including after PM Netanyahu's visit to US President Trump in the White House.

Iran meanwhile is licking its wounds. The failure of its forward defence strategy in deterring US/Israeli attacks has forced a national debate about the policies needed to safeguard the country (and the regime) from future attacks. Emerging elements indicate that there is no desire to abandon the nuclear programme, and that the regime will likely take on an even more militarised bent, with its hardliners feeling vindicated in their claim that nothing good would come out of engaging with the West. In terms of reform to social and economic control, the outcome is unknown.

As anticipated in Risk Intelligence products, Iran's primary focus of the post-conflict discussion appears to be the rebuilding of a credible anti-air defence and air force – with China being the only likely provider of such capabilities. Iran is therefore more likely to abandon its "neither east nor west" policy and embrace its eastern partnerships as well as seek to mend ties with the Gulf.

Iranian FM Araghchi consequently visited Saudi Arabia on Tuesday 8 July to discuss recent events, and likely de-conflict the many security measures enacted in the Persian Gulf. This is expected to include Electromagnetic Interference liable to disrupt vessels' GNSS, a threat to vessels and above all to Persian Gulf states' budgets.

Threat levels

In the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Houthi forces have expanded their list of potential targets several times since November 2023. Some attacks were likely carried out based on outdated information in publicly available databases, underlining the threat level for collateral damage.

Current threat levels reflect both the enduring status quo and shifting Houthi rhetoric, which appears to be focusing more on attacking Israeli territory than vessels while not announcing any suspension of its maritime efforts.

Overall, US and Western European vessels are exposed to an intrinsically higher threat level than vessels from other countries – a consequence of the perceived alignment of European foreign policy on US goals, including their support for Israel.

The new attacks by the Houthis support Risk Intelligence's threat levels as described below, indicating that vessels calling Israel are at a severe risk of being struck by the Houthis.

Potential targets	Threat type	Threat level
Merchant ships specifically linked to Israel through ownership, port calls, trade with and/or commercial relationship between Israeli companies and owners/operators	Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	Severe
Merchant ships linked to the United States, United Kingdom and other countries involved in Operation Poseidon Archer	Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	Elevated
Merchant ships linked to countries participating in or supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Aspides	Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention	Elevated
Other merchant ships in transit through the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden	Kinetic attack due to misidentification, potential proximity to the above threats ('collateral damage')	Moderate

The Houthis are expected to continue targeting vessels which are owned by companies that are trading with Israel, meaning a continued severe threat level for these ships. They are likely to show more restraint in targeting US/UK ships, following the deal announced on 6 May 2025.

Despite multiple military operations, Houthi forces remain capable of conducting attacks. These are not limited to the southern Red Sea where they control a large portion of coastline. Several ships have also been struck in the Gulf of Aden. Attacks by drone boats, however, are very likely limited to the southern Red Sea.

While the Houthis' capabilities to launch missiles have been likely degraded by military strikes, the strikes' actual impact cannot be assessed. Moreover, reports about military actions are solely based on military sources and not independently verified. Any meaningful and sustainable reduction of the threat posed by the Houthis would require a longer-term mission.

For merchant ships linked to countries solely supporting the US-led and EU-led naval operations with a defensive mandate, the threat level is assessed as lower compared to countries participating in offensive military actions. For all other commercial ships, the same threat level applies.

Vessels not related to countries taking part in naval operations may be targeted due to misidentification. Proximity to kinetic attacks or to interceptions of drones and missiles by military forces could also lead to collateral damage.

Finally, it is vital to consider that the situation remains dynamic and requires close monitoring. Updates regarding incidents as well as constantly updated assessments of current threat levels are available through the Risk Intelligence System.

Background

Starting with the seizure of the GALAXY LEADER on 19 November 2023, Risk Intelligence has identified dozens of attacks by Houthi forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The number of attacks against merchant ships has been limited since September 2024, due to the limited number of potential targets and the fact that the Houthis have firmly established the threat.

This analysis is supported by traffic figures which suggest that the shipping industry has adapted to the situation. Even when no attacks had been conducted by the Houthis for several weeks, maritime traffic did not increase. At the same time, clusters of attacks have not caused a further decrease in traffic either (see Figure 1).




Figure 1: Attacks against merchant ships per month (blue columns) and number of monthly Bab el Mandeb transits by merchant ships >10,000 dwt (red line) (Source: Risk Intelligence System / Lloyd's List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

Note: Detailed statistics about Houthi attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since November 2023 are also available on the Risk Intelligence System.

Figure 1 indicates that the Houthis have reached their goal and are more likely to be reacting to political events than to maritime activity in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The amount of maritime traffic in this area has remained steady since February 2024, regardless of attack levels.

The decision to return to the Red Sea will very likely be determined by economic factors, e.g. insurance premiums or pressure from charterers, possibly supported by political declarations that would placate the Houthis.

Figure 2 below indicates that the shipping industry in general is still adopting a "wait-and-see" attitude regarding a potential return to Red Sea transits, though the pressure on mounting a return is increasing. Nobody wants to go first, but nobody wants to be last.




Figure 2: Suez Transits Year on Year comparison, indicating a sustained decrease to the new normal, even with several months without attacks by the Houthis. (Source: Lloyd's List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

Ongoing military operations have not lowered the threat level for commercial shipping substantively. For transits through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, it should be noted that naval recommendations to switch off AIS are not based on credible figures. Both the EU-led and the US-led military operations have published data about the targeting of merchant ships transiting the area with or without AIS on.

These statistics, however, do not align with each other. Raw data used for the analysis has not been made public. The results are therefore at least questionable, underlined by misleading public statements from EU naval officers which have claimed that no ship with AIS off has been successfully targeted by the Houthis.

As indicated by the graph below, numbers available to Risk Intelligence show no substantial change in traffic pattern over the last months.




Figure 3: Volume of cargo transported by cargo carrying vessels of 10,000 dwt+ active in the Red Sea (Source: Lloyd's List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that switching off AIS lowers the chances of vessels being targeted. It may in some cases limit the success rate for missile attacks in particular, but this does not necessarily apply to attacks conducted by aerial or naval drones. Moreover, not broadcasting AIS may complicate efforts to support a ship after an attack. Less than 10% of merchant ships transiting through the Bab el Mandeb are conducting their voyages without AIS. This figure has not changed significantly during the Houthis campaign.

Guidance on commercial operations

Ship transits

Several shipping industry organisations have published the "Interim Industry Transit Advice, Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden – September 2024". Among other information, the document includes considerations about routing and vessel hardening. The Joint Maritime Information Centre has also issued bridge emergency reference cards in October 2024. Finally, a new "BMP Maritime Security" document was released in March 2025, with updated security and mitigation measures applicable to Red Sea transits.

All documents are available via www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org.

Vessel registration and incident reporting

It is strongly recommended for all merchant ships transiting the Western Indian Ocean, the Somali Basin, the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea to register with UKMTO and the Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO). Any incidents or suspicious activities should also be reported to UKMTO and MSCIO.

Contact details UKMTO

Email: watchkeepers@ukmto.org

Phone: +44 2393 222060

Website: www.ukmto.org

Contact details MSCIO

Email: postmaster@mscio.eu

Phone: +33 298 220 220 or +33 298 220 170

Website: www.mscio.eu

If a vessel is under attack, **US naval forces in Bahrain** are able to coordinate assistance.

Phone: +973 1785 3879

Email: m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil

Combined Maritime Forces also recommend ignoring VHF calls by "Yemeni navy" with instructions to alter course to Hudaydah or other locations in Yemen. When merchant ships are contacted, masters are advised to continue the voyage and call for a coalition warship on VHF Channel 16, stating current location, situation and intentions.

In addition, vessel operators are advised to contact the respective flag state for additional guidance or requirements regarding incident reporting procedures.

Mitigation measures

Risk Intelligence strongly recommends merchant ship operators to assess whether the respective vessel has been owned or managed by Israel-affiliated companies in the past. Such information may not have been updated in publicly available databases and could lead to misidentification of current commercial links with Israel.

Prior to voyages through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, ship operators should conduct a thorough ship and voyage-specific threat and risk assessment in line with shipping industry best practices. In addition, the following measures should be considered:

- Constant monitoring of the security situation, enabling vessels to avoid locations with recent or ongoing incidents.
- Introduction/update of contingency plans on the company level to address the possibility of seafarers being injured, killed or kidnapped during a security incident. The plan should include contingency and emergency plans; appropriate drills should be completed.
- Crew briefings and scenario drills based on a valid and relevant anti-attack plan to ensure that incidents are reported and alarm is raised without delay when required. Drills should include scenarios with major damage and casualties.
- Enhancement of firefighting, evacuation and damage control procedures, taking into account the possibility of significant damage as a result of direct targeting or collateral damage.
- Enhancement of medical equipment to deal with multiple casualties.
- Emergency contacts placed readily available on the bridge.
- Bridge team briefing regarding hailing/harassment via VHF, prepared responses and immediate contact with naval forces in the respective area. (Local authorities' calls on VHF may be an act of spoofing or even targeting, underlined by several incidents in recent days which involved self-proclaimed 'Yemeni authorities' or the 'Yemeni navy' ordering merchant ships to alter course.)
- Preparation of citadel with emergency provisions and functioning satellite phone.
- Depending on individual circumstances, embarkation of armed guards may be useful to mitigate specific risks, specifically in relation to the threat of boardings from small boats (e.g. Houthi forces, Somali piracy). However, the threat of direct targeting by missiles, aerial or naval drones used by Houthi forces in Yemen (southern Red Sea / Gulf of Aden) cannot be mitigated by embarkation of armed guards.

New and reinforced BMP "Maritime Security" guidelines were published in March 2025, offering guidance in mitigating current threats such as attacks by missiles, drones or waterborne IEDs ('drone boats') as well as pirates. The new and updated guidelines reflect the current threats faced by vessels navigating through the Bab el Mandeb and provide a firm starting point for mitigation measures to be conceived and implemented. Vessel-specific considerations are still recommended.

Ship operators should also consider developing adapted procedures for transits through the Red Sea and/or the Gulf of Aden. This guidance should consider specific scenarios (e.g. aerial or waterborne threats, hailing on VHF) and include actions by the crew to minimise the impact of any security incidents.

Red Sea – threat assessment (summary)

There is a high threat of insurgency operations carried out by Houthi forces in Yemen affecting merchant traffic in the southern Red Sea. The Houthis may seek to strike vessels with air and sea-borne drones or missiles. These strikes have been concentrated off Yemen's western coast and in the western Gulf of Aden. Certain ships, such as those linked to Israel by Houthi determination, are highly likely to be targeted if present in that area. The Houthis' maritime campaign was started in November 2023 in reaction to the Israel's post-7 October offensive into Gaza.

In the first incidents to take place in the Red Sea in 2025, the bulk carriers MAGIC SEAS and ETERNITY C. were attacked on 6 and 7 July respectively. Both attacks involved small craft as well as more heavy ordnance, though limited airborne means beyond a single missile. Reporting suggested that in both cases the managers had other vessels trading into Israel. It is not yet clear as to whether these were isolated incidents or the resumption of a more systematic Houthi campaign.

The maritime campaign was suspended on 19 January 2025, but not formally ended, and the 6 July attack was the first apparent maritime strike against civilian shipping since December 2024. The primary threat currently is from collateral damage as Houthi and US/Israeli assets exchange ordnance in the area. The US had resumed a campaign of aerial bombing for a few months after Trump's return to power, though this was suspended by a ceasefire in May 2025. It is unclear to which group of vessels the US-Houthi ceasefire deal applies, though it does not appear to extend beyond US vessels.

Israeli attacks on Iran during June did not have an impact on the situation in the Red Sea, with the Houthis already launching missiles against Israel. The Houthis threatened retaliation following US strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities overnight on 21-22 June, but no specific actions took place. It is unknown whether the Houthis intend to resume attacks against US forces, having signed a ceasefire with the US in May 2025.

Israel and the Houthis are still engaged in a cycle of retaliation strikes which maintains a high threat level in the southern Red Sea. On 12 March 2025, the Houthis had threatened to resume strikes against "Israeli vessels" in the Red Sea, whereas these were already "banned" under Houthi policy. Houthi attempts at missile and drone strikes against Israel are expected to continue in the medium term.

Overall, while the conditions for a return of shipping have begun to appear, there is still some way to go before a return to the pre-campaign normal. The shipping industry must be convinced that the current lull in attacks is not just temporary. Notably, political considerations in Yemen must favour a continued cessation of Houthi strikes at sea. The latest progress may easily be inverted, particularly given political pressure in Israel to continue the fighting in Gaza.

Maritime security in the southern Red Sea is also affected by the conflict in Yemen as some fighting between the Houthis and the rival government supported by the Saudi-led coalition continues. The maritime dimension to this conflict is limited as diplomacy continues. The threat

level for direct attacks against port and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is moderate while talks continue.

There is a dispute between Yemen and Eritrea in the Hanish Islands area, primarily due to fishing. Due to the irregular nature of Yemeni coastguard forces, or the difficulty in identifying Eritrean craft (which are small speedboats), there are problems with merchant vessels misidentifying small patrol craft from Yemen and Eritrea as pirate vessels. Aggressive enforcement by coastguard vessels, or local craft attempting to warn away merchant vessels, are possible threats in the area. The piracy threat is minimal, even in southern areas, as this area is now considered to be outside the operational range of Somali pirates. The fighting in Sudan is not expected to affect threat levels in the Red Sea, though increased and indiscriminate jamming in the waters between Port Sudan and Jeddah pose a threat to navigation.

Threat levels

Refer to the section "Methodology / Definitions" for a definition of threat levels. A concise assessment of all threats listed in the table can be found on the Risk Intelligence System.

Threat type	Threat level
Terrorism	Moderate
Piracy	Low
Insurgency and Military Operations	High
Cargo Theft	Moderate
Smuggling	Elevated
Stowaways and human trafficking	Low
Fraud and corruption	Low
Activism	Low

Persian Gulf – threat assessment (summary)

This assessment covers the Persian Gulf including the Strait of Hormuz and approaches through the Gulf of Oman. The primary maritime threat are actions taken or supported by Iran to threaten merchant ship transits or port and anchorage areas. The current threat level is high, but higher for vessels linked to Israel and the US given current developments in the conflict between Iran and Israel. The threat level is expected to decrease in coming weeks, once the ceasefire has proven its durability.

On 13 June 2025, Israel started a wave of strikes in Iran. Dozens of targets across Iran, some related to the nuclear programme, and other civilian and military facilities, were struck by the Israeli Air Force. Unprecedented overnight strikes were conducted on 21-22 June 2025 by the US against Iranian nuclear facilities to limited effect. This prompted Iranian lawmakers gathered on 22 June to vote on closing the Strait of Hormuz, which did not materialise before the ceasefire of 24 June. The events have marked a turning point in the Middle East's recently bloody history.

The March 2023 deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran is expected to have a longer-term impact on threat levels in the Persian Gulf, as well as the substantial Chinese interest in maintaining unimpeded access to the region's ports. It is possible that future Iranian actions will occur mainly south of the Strait of Hormuz, in an effort by the Iranians not to provoke Saudis. Seizure patterns since March 2023 support this assessment, although this might be under increased pressure as US and Iranian operations in the area escalate.

Aggressive enforcement by Iran of its waters is expected to continue. Surveillance, harassment and detentions of merchant vessels are frequent. This enforcement might be linked to specific goals, such as preventing fuel smuggling, but also to demonstrate naval capabilities. Seizure and detention of vessels might take place related to specific political and commercial disputes, and Iranian retaliation to incidents affecting its own shipping operations.

There has been an increase in naval patrolling in the area by a number of countries in response to the current threat situation, improving responses to incidents affecting vessels. The US initiative of the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), headquartered in Bahrain, includes Coalition Task Force (CTF) Operation Sentinel to provide naval patrols and coordination for sea lanes in the area. The EU has ended the EMASoH mandate, and transferred its responsibilities to Operation ASPIDES, whose mandate now covers an area of operations including the Arabian Sea, the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf.

Other threats are typically low to moderate. Pirate groups are not present in the area, although low-level disputes between fishing fleets and criminal groups engaged in maritime crime are possible. There is also a substantial volume of local traffic, including small craft engaged in smuggling. These are often mistaken for other threats and may manoeuvre close to merchant vessels to use them as cover against detection by law enforcement, or to 'warn away' merchant vessels from their activities.

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Indian Ocean – threat assessment (summary)

This area covers the western Indian Ocean (north of Madagascar, east towards India), including the Somali Basin, Gulf of Aden, and western Arabian Sea. Houthi operations targeting merchant ships in transit can take place in the western Gulf of Aden where threat levels are similar to the southern Red Sea. In the Indian Ocean, there is an elevated threat of piracy off Somalia and a moderate drone threat to merchant ships in the Somali Basin, Gulf of Oman and the Arabian Sea.

The drone threat is currently moderate following the Houthi announcement on 19 January 2025 that trade through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden would re-open for all categories except Israeli-flagged vessels or vessels directly owned by Israeli entities. A re-start to the Houthi campaign is possible, based on Houthi perceptions of Israeli actions or in response to US military action against Iran. However, the general targeting of merchant vessels is unlikely in the short term for the Indian Ocean. There are currently no other implications in the Indian Ocean of the Israeli/US military operations against Iran and any possible Iranian response.

The threat of pirate operations in the Somali Basin and the Gulf of Aden is elevated. Recent cases show that pirates retain boarding capabilities at significant distances offshore, as far as 800 nautical miles from Somalia. Pirate activity declined through 2024, and activity has been reported infrequently in recent months. This might be due to a perception by the pirates that the risk vs reward calculation for targeting merchant vessels has changed. As such, the threat trend is downward.

There have been several reported boardings of fishing dhows off Somalia since November 2023, which continued through 2024 and into 2025. These boardings were likely linked to illegal fishing activity in the area, which is an ongoing issue and has been a focus for Somalia in expanding its maritime enforcement capabilities. Most current pirate activity is focused on these operations close to the Somali coast.

Merchant ships in transit should be aware of the potential to encounter small armed craft in this area, particularly the Gulf of Aden. These might be fishermen, traders, smugglers, militia or irregular military forces, or military or coastguard patrols operating out of southern Yemen or northern Somalia. Such craft might manoeuvre close to merchant ships while not presenting a threat.

Naval patrols operate in the area, such as EUNAVFOR's Operation Atalanta. Naval mandates include maritime crimes (such as drugs and arms smuggling) as well as countering piracy. The group transit scheme for the Gulf of Aden is still operational. National deployments are also ongoing, such as the Indian naval presence which has been effective in recent actions.

Shipping industry associations have published transit guidance for the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, emphasising the importance of thorough ship and voyage-specific threat and risk assessments before passing through the area. UKMTO operates the Voluntary Reporting Area for the Indian Ocean, specifically the Red Sea, Gulf of Aden, and Arabian Sea. UKMTO acts as primary point of contact for merchant vessels and liaison with military forces in the region.

MSCIO (formerly known as MSCHOA) manages the EUNAVFOR (EU Naval Forces Somalia and Operation Atalanta) voluntary registration scheme for ships transiting the area and communicates EUNAVFOR counter-piracy guidance to the maritime industry.


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Activism	Low

Methodology / Definitions

All threat levels are based on the likelihood of a threat type occurring, with generic consequences described in the relevant sections. All threat levels are based on an assessment of capabilities, intentions and opportunities of potential perpetrators, separated into different categories.



Maritime operators are typically unable to lower the threat level by influencing the underlying variables. However, all variables are subject to change over time, e.g. changes in the intentions or capabilities of potential perpetrators. They should therefore be re-assessed as required.

In an additional step, the threat levels assessed here can be used to identify the risk level for a particular type of operations. Determining the risk level also requires an assessment of the vulnerability and the potential consequence of a particular incident. Appropriate mitigation measures can then be implemented to lower the risk level.

Threat levels

All threat levels mentioned above are assessed based on the likelihood and consequence of a particular threat type occurring. The levels are:

- Low: Not expected in the operational area or in proximity.
- Moderate: Not expected in the operational area but possible in proximity.
- Elevated: Possible in the operational area or in proximity.
- High: Expected in the operational area or in proximity.
- Severe: Commonplace in the operational area or in proximity.

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