



RiskIntelligence

# Red Sea / Gulf of Aden: Weekly Intelligence Report

18 June 2025

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## Red Sea / Gulf of Aden: Weekly Intelligence Report

This report provides an overview of the situation in the southern Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden including an assessments of threat levels for attacks against different types of merchant ships operating in these areas.

Time of latest intelligence included in this report: 18 June 2025, 08:00 UTC.

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## Recent incidents (Red Sea / Gulf of Aden)

No incidents which have directly affected merchant ships in the southern Red Sea, the Bab el Mandeb or the Gulf of Aden have been recorded on the Risk Intelligence System during the past 30 days.

Comprehensive descriptions for previous incidents can be found on the Risk Intelligence System. Detailed statistics of attacks against commercial shipping which have been carried out by Houthi forces since November 2023 are available on the Risk Intelligence System.

## Current situation

**As of writing, the situation in the Red Sea has remained stable despite the Israeli strikes in Iran. The Houthis and Israel are already involved in the retaliatory cycle of attacks, and are expected to continue to do so, with the latest strikes against Iran not expected to significantly alter the equation. There are significant efforts at informational warfare by all belligerents and their backers.**

**The threat level in the Persian Gulf has heightened, reflecting acute tensions in the Persian Gulf. Iran is not expected to retaliate by shutting oil flow through the Persian Gulf, so long as the Ayatollah's regime does not feel threatened in its existence. There are concerns about a possible US participation in the attacks on Iran, although the US is already considered to be the enabler of the Israeli campaign.**

US forces have carried out military strikes against targets in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen between January 2024 and January 2025. An intensified US campaign was then carried out from March to early May 2025. The strikes were conducted both unilaterally and as joint strikes with the UK military, supported by several other countries.

US-coordinated offensive military actions have been conducted under Operation Poseidon Archer. For political reasons, these were separate from the US-led Operation Prosperity Guardian which is merely aimed at protecting commercial shipping.

Since the beginning of the Houthi campaign in November 2023, Houthi forces have largely stuck to publicly announced targeting criteria. Some attacks during the early stages of the campaign apparently relied on outdated information about individual ships. No such incidents have been reported since the second quarter of 2024. Overall, Houthi attacks against merchant ships have not been 'indiscriminate' despite widespread claims by the US and other Western governments.

### Red Sea campaign's status

The Red Sea campaign has effectively been paused since 19 January 2025, and has not resumed despite the Israeli attack on Iran. The threat level is expected to remain static. Currently, the Houthis have banned "Israeli vessels" from transiting the Bab el Mandeb. The ceasefire between US forces and the Houthis announced on 6 May has held so far. In return for a halt of US airstrikes, the Houthis would stop their attacks against US naval forces and "US vessels". At the same time, the cycle of retaliation between Israel and the Houthis is expected to continue, as it serves the political goals of both entities' leaderships.

The Houthis have repeatedly signalled that they did not intend to relaunch the campaign against merchant ships, with the US ceasefire essentially irrelevant to the general situation. The Houthis will likely continue to focus on occasional attempts to strike Israeli territory, as demonstrated by continued strikes over the past week.

This assessment does not preclude a resumption of strikes against commercial ships, which remains subject to Houthis' political goals, especially if the volume of maritime traffic in the Red Sea resumes to a level that undermines claims that an effective embargo has been implemented. There is no expectation that the Houthis resume a maritime campaign in the short term, despite the Israeli strikes on Iran. The Houthis' interest with regards to the maritime campaign remains as is prior to the Israeli strikes in Iran.

### Israeli strikes on Iran

On 13 June 2025, Israel launched a number of strikes on targets in Tehran, and throughout Iran, claimed to be linked to the country's nuclear programme. These targets have continued into their fifth day. Available information indicates Israel has likely decided to attempt to destroy the Iranian state, with the nuclear programme proving mainly an excuse for the large-scale destruction the Israeli air force is inflicting in the country.

Israel has targeted Iran's economic infrastructure as well as civilian infrastructure unrelated to nuclear activities, including TV stations and police stations, in a likely effort to upend the Iranian state's regular functions. Crucially, Israel has also targeted energy infrastructure and energy export infrastructure, vital to the Iranian economy and the Ayatollah's stay in power.

Iran has retaliated by targeting military installations, like Israel initially, but has also expanded to targeting population centres and economic facilities, raising fears of further targeting and impact against Israeli ports and economic facilities. Given Iran's defensive, and weaker, posture, it is expected to adopt a retaliatory approach – attempting to punch back where it can on Israel's pain points, such as ports and important economic infrastructure.

### Maritime consequences

So far, the maritime consequences off Iran and Israel are relatively limited. Iranian ports are under fire from Israeli forces, and the destruction may spread to most economic facilities on the Iranian coastline, but no moving vessels have been targeted, and Iran has not yet signalled an intent to shut off the Persian Gulf, wary of spurring the US into action, or pushing Gulf states to further side with Israel.

Israeli ports have also come under fire from Iran to a lesser degree, given Iran's reduced capabilities, but Iran has expressed an intent to eventually strike these targets harder, on a retaliatory basis. Iran's targeting is likely to be more deliberate, by no concern for civilian damage with Israeli population centers already being struck, but to conserve limited ammunition in what may be a protracted war. They may therefore choose to retaliate against energy and maritime targets in Israel depending on the targets struck by Israel in Iran.

The disruption of GNSS and other navigational signals in the Persian Gulf and off Israel are likely to reach heightened levels and have already had safety at sea consequences, with several vessels burning in the Persian Gulf over last week following a collision. The issue is not assessed to be caused by violence from either belligerent.

## Mid-term considerations

Israel's attack on Iran marks a turning point in Middle East politics, but the dust has not yet settled, so any conclusions appear premature. Several points have however emerged which may shed light on what a future Middle East may look like.

Several of Israel's far-right leaders talk about their desired "Syriafication" of Iran, an euphemism for perpetuating a state of slow burning chaos which prevents any political progress. Syriafication as a strategy is the conduct of strikes against civilian infrastructure and political/military structures, across time and space, designed both to degrade an economy and the state's monopoly of violence.

This is the strategy deployed by Israel in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen, where civilian and military political leaders, as well as infrastructure are struck regardless of the threat posed. This means strikes against coastal patrol boats in maintenance in Lattaquié, emergency meetings of local authorities in Lebanon, or police stations in Iran, on top of militarily justified strikes against hostile actors. In theory, the populations already suffering from these dictatorships further struggle to secure their livelihoods, chains of command are fragilised as leadership is killed repeatedly, and the dam of grievances bursts, ultimately degrading a state's ability to rule and to threaten Israel.

It is likely Israelis are attempting Syriafication in Iran, and will therefore target civilian facilities, including ports, to weaken the Ayatollah's regime by hurting its wallet and killing the chain of command. Whether Iranians will entertain the idea of complying with Israeli-wrought regime change is another matter.

The future of nuclear talks is also up in the air. Iran now has no material reasons to negotiate a nuclear deal since the threat of an attack, which underpinned all talks, has materialised. In Iran, Israel's actions will have proven, if there was any doubt left among Iranians, that the only guarantee of sovereignty and survival for the state is the nuclear weapon. The US's denials of involvement in the Israeli attacks will come off as dishonest to the Iranian regime, and there is a widespread impression of duplicity – that the US lulled it into a sense of security via talks, to enable an Israeli assault. Whatever new regime may emerge out of the Israeli campaign will not be friendly to the US or Israel and will have no incentive to cease pursuing the nuclear weapon, but rather to accelerate its acquisition.

Finally, the attack will also reinforce arguments for military regimes across the Middle East, since there is no longer any threshold for state-on-state violence – two countries who are not at war are bombarding each other's cities. No actor is expected to commit to any partnership or abide by any rules. The ensuing sense of insecurity will favor strongmen claiming to protect their country. But all of them will have observed that striking economic targets like ports and terminals, such as Port Sudan, Bandar Abbas and Haifa, is not a career-ending move.

## Threat levels

In the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, Houthi forces have expanded their list of potential targets several times since November 2023. Some attacks were likely carried out based on outdated information in publicly available databases, underlining the threat level for collateral damage.

Current threat levels reflect both the enduring status quo and shifting Houthi rhetoric, which appears to be focusing more on attacking Israeli territory than vessels while not announcing any suspension of its maritime efforts. Likewise, the deal announced by the US and Oman may be the prelude to a reduction of threat levels to some vessel categories.

Overall, US and Western European vessels are exposed to an intrinsically higher threat level than vessels from other countries – a consequence of the perceived alignment of European foreign policy on US goals, including their support for Israel. The absence of recent maritime attacks should not be interpreted as a cessation of hostilities by the Houthis, but rather a reflection of their success. Virtually none of their preferred targets are currently passing through the region.

| Potential targets  | Threat type   | Threat level    |
|--|---|-----------------|
| Merchant ships specifically linked to Israel through ownership, port calls, trade with and/or commercial relationship between Israeli companies and owners/operators | Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention                       | <b>Severe</b>   |
| Merchant ships linked to the United States, United Kingdom and other countries involved in Operation Poseidon Archer   | Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention                       | <b>Elevated</b> |
| Merchant ships linked to countries participating in or supporting Operation Prosperity Guardian or Operation Aspides   | Kinetic attack (missile, aerial/waterborne drone), possibly seizure and detention                       | <b>Elevated</b> |
| Other merchant ships in transit through the Red Sea/Gulf of Aden   | Kinetic attack due to misidentification, potential proximity to the above threats ('collateral damage') | <b>Moderate</b> |

The Houthis are expected to continue targeting vessels which are owned by companies that are trading with Israel, meaning a continued severe threat level for these ships. They are likely to show more constraint in targeting US/UK ships, following the deal announced on 6 May 2025. This is not tantamount to the elimination of the threat, as neither the US nor the Houthis are certain to keep their word in terms of striking hostile targets.

Despite multiple military operations, Houthi forces remain capable of conducting attacks. These are not limited to the southern Red Sea where they control a large portion of coastline. Several ships have also been struck in the Gulf of Aden. Attacks by drone boats, however, are very likely limited to the southern Red Sea.



While the Houthis' capabilities to launch missiles have been likely degraded by military strikes, the strikes' actual impact cannot be assessed. Moreover, reports about military actions are solely based on military sources and not independently verified. Any meaningful and sustainable reduction of the threat posed by the Houthis would require a longer-term mission.

For merchant ships linked to countries solely supporting the US-led and EU-led naval operations with a defensive mandate, the threat level is assessed as lower compared to countries participating in offensive military actions. For all other commercial ships, the same threat level applies.


Vessels not related to countries taking part in naval operations may be targeted due to misidentification. Proximity to kinetic attacks or to interceptions of drones and missiles by military forces could also lead to collateral damage.

Finally, it is vital to consider that the situation remains dynamic and requires close monitoring. Updates regarding incidents as well as constantly updated assessments of current threat levels are available through the Risk Intelligence System.

## Background

Starting with the seizure of the GALAXY LEADER on 19 November 2023, Risk Intelligence has identified dozens of attacks by Houthi forces in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The number of attacks against merchant ships has been limited since September 2024, due to the limited number of potential targets and the fact that the Houthis have firmly established the threat.

This analysis is supported by traffic figures which suggest that the shipping industry has adapted to the situation. Even when no attacks had been conducted by the Houthis for several weeks, maritime traffic did not increase. At the same time, clusters of attacks have not caused a further decrease in traffic either (see Figure 1).



*Figure 1: Attacks against merchant ships per month (blue columns) and number of monthly Bab el Mandeb transits by merchant ships >10,000 dwt (red line) (Source: Risk Intelligence System / Lloyd's List Intelligence/Seasearcher)*

**Note: Detailed statistics about Houthi attacks against commercial ships in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden since November 2023 are also available on the Risk Intelligence System.**

Figure 1 indicates that the Houthis have reached their goal and are more likely to be reacting to political events than to maritime activity in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The amount of maritime traffic in this area has remained steady since February 2024, regardless of attack levels.

The decision to return to the Red Sea will very likely be determined by economic factors, e.g. insurance premiums or pressure from charterers, possibly supported by political declarations that would placate the Houthis.

Figure 2 below indicates that the shipping industry in general is still adopting a "wait-and-see" attitude regarding a potential return to Red Sea transits.




Figure 2: Suez Transits Year on Year comparison, indicating a sustained decrease to the new normal, even with several months without attacks by the Houthis. (Source: Lloyd's List Intelligence/Seasearcher)

Ongoing military operations have not lowered the threat level for commercial shipping substantively. For transits through the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, it should be noted that naval recommendations to switch off AIS are not based on credible figures. Both the EU-led and the US-led military operations have published data about the targeting of merchant ships transiting the area with or without AIS on.

These statistics, however, do not align with each other. Raw data used for the analysis has not been made public. The results are therefore at least questionable, underlined by misleading public statements from EU naval officers which have claimed that no ship with AIS off has been successfully targeted by the Houthis.

Overall, there is no evidence to suggest that switching off AIS lowers the chances of vessels being targeted. It may limit the success rate for missile attacks in particular, but this does not necessarily apply to attacks conducted by aerial or naval drones. Moreover, not broadcasting AIS may complicate efforts to support a ship after an attack. Less than 10% of merchant ships transiting through the Bab el Mandeb are conducting their voyages without AIS. This figure has not changed significantly during the Houthi campaign.

# Guidance on commercial operations

## Ship transits

Several shipping industry organisations have published the "Interim Industry Transit Advice, Southern Red Sea and Gulf of Aden – September 2024". Among other information, the document includes considerations about routing and vessel hardening. The Joint Maritime Information Centre has also issued bridge emergency reference cards in October 2024. Finally, a new "BMP Maritime Security" document was released in March 2025, with updated security and mitigation measures applicable to Red Sea transits.

All documents are available via [www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org](http://www.maritimeglobalsecurity.org).

## Vessel registration and incident reporting

It is strongly recommended for all merchant ships transiting the Western Indian Ocean, the Somali Basin, the Gulf of Aden, Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea to register with UKMTO and the Maritime Security Centre Indian Ocean (MSCIO). Any incidents or suspicious activities should also be reported to UKMTO and MSCIO.

### Contact details UKMTO

Email: [watchkeepers@ukmto.org](mailto:watchkeepers@ukmto.org)

Phone: +44 2393 222060

Website: [www.ukmto.org](http://www.ukmto.org)

### Contact details MSCIO

Email: [postmaster@mscio.eu](mailto:postmaster@mscio.eu)

Phone: +33 298 220 220 or +33 298 220 170

Website: [www.mscio.eu](http://www.mscio.eu)

If a vessel is under attack, **US naval forces in Bahrain** are able to coordinate assistance.

Phone: +973 1785 3879

Email: [m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil](mailto:m-ba-navcent-ncags@us.navy.mil)

Combined Maritime Forces also recommend ignoring VHF calls by "Yemeni navy" with instructions to alter course to Hudaydah or other locations in Yemen. When merchant ships are contacted, masters are advised to continue the voyage and call for a coalition warship on VHF Channel 16, stating current location, situation and intentions.

In addition, vessel operators are advised to contact the respective flag state for additional guidance or requirements regarding incident reporting procedures.

## Mitigation measures

Risk Intelligence strongly recommends merchant ship operators to assess whether the respective vessel has been owned or managed by Israel-affiliated companies in the past. Such information may not have been updated in publicly available databases and could lead to misidentification of current commercial links with Israel.

Prior to voyages through the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, ship operators should conduct a thorough ship and voyage-specific threat and risk assessment in line with shipping industry best practices. In addition, the following measures should be considered:

- Constant monitoring of the security situation, enabling vessels to avoid locations with recent or ongoing incidents.
- Introduction/update of contingency plans on the company level to address the possibility of seafarers being injured, killed or kidnapped during a security incident. The plan should include contingency and emergency plans; appropriate drills should be completed.
- Crew briefings and scenario drills based on a valid and relevant anti-attack plan to ensure that incidents are reported and alarm is raised without delay when required. Drills should include scenarios with major damage and casualties.
- Enhancement of firefighting, evacuation and damage control procedures, taking into account the possibility of significant damage as a result of direct targeting or collateral damage.
- Enhancement of medical equipment to deal with multiple casualties.
- Emergency contacts placed readily available on the bridge.
- Bridge team briefing regarding hailing/harassment via VHF, prepared responses and immediate contact with naval forces in the respective area. (Local authorities' calls on VHF may be an act of spoofing or even targeting, underlined by several incidents in recent days which involved self-proclaimed 'Yemeni authorities' or the 'Yemeni navy' ordering merchant ships to alter course.)
- Preparation of citadel with emergency provisions and functioning satellite phone.
- Depending on individual circumstances, embarkation of armed guards may be useful to mitigate specific risks, specifically in relation to the threat of boardings from small boats (e.g. Houthi forces, Somali piracy). However, the threat of direct targeting by missiles, aerial or naval drones used by Houthi forces in Yemen (southern Red Sea / Gulf of Aden) cannot be mitigated by embarkation of armed guards.

New and reinforced BMP "Maritime Security" guidelines were published in March 2025, offering guidance in mitigating current threats such as attacks by missiles, drones or waterborne IEDs ('drone boats') as well as pirates. The new and updated guidelines reflect the current threats faced by vessels navigating through the Bab el Mandeb and provide a firm starting point for mitigation measures to be conceived and implemented. Vessel-specific considerations are still recommended.

Ship operators should also consider developing adapted procedures for transits through the Red Sea and/or the Gulf of Aden. This guidance should consider specific scenarios (e.g. aerial or waterborne threats, hailing on VHF) and include actions by the crew to minimise the impact of any security incidents.

## Red Sea – threat assessment (summary)

There is a high threat of insurgency operations carried out by Houthi forces in Yemen affecting merchant traffic in the southern Red Sea. The Houthis may seek to strike vessels with air and sea-borne drones or missiles. These strikes have been concentrated off Yemen's western coast and in the western Gulf of Aden. Certain ships, such as those linked to Israel by Houthi determination, are highly likely to be targeted if present in that area. The Houthis' maritime campaign was started in November 2023 in reaction to the Israel's post-7 October offensive into Gaza.

The Israeli attacks on Iran begun on 13 June 2025, are not expected to have an impact on the situation in the Red Sea, with the Houthis already launching missiles against Israel.

The maritime campaign was suspended on 19 January 2025, but not formally ended, and there have been no maritime strikes against civilian shipping since December 2024. It is unlikely that the Houthis will resume their widespread campaign of drone and missile strikes against ships. The primary threat currently is from collateral damage as Houthi and US/Israeli assets exchange ordnance in the area.

The US had resumed a campaign of aerial bombing for a few months after Trump's return to power, though this was suspended by a ceasefire in May 2025. It is unclear to which group of vessels the US-Houthi ceasefire deal applies, though it does not appear to extend beyond US vessels.

Israel and the Houthis are still engaged in a cycle of retaliation strikes which maintains a high threat level in the southern Red Sea. On 12 March 2025, the Houthis had threatened to resume strikes against "Israeli vessels" in the Red Sea, whereas these were already "banned" under Houthi policy. Houthi attempts at missile and drone strikes against Israel are expected to continue in the medium term.

Overall, while the conditions for a return of shipping have begun to appear, there is still some way to go before a return to the pre-campaign normal. The shipping industry must be convinced that the current lull in attacks is not just temporary. Notably, political considerations in Yemen must favour a continued cessation of Houthi strikes at sea. The latest progress may easily be inverted, particularly given political pressure in Israel to continue the fighting in Gaza.

Maritime security in the southern Red Sea is also affected by the conflict in Yemen as some fighting between the Houthis and the rival government supported by the Saudi-led coalition continues. The maritime dimension to this conflict is limited as diplomacy continues. The threat level for direct attacks against port and oil facilities in Saudi Arabia and the UAE is moderate while talks continue.

There is a dispute between Yemen and Eritrea in the Hanish Islands area, primarily due to fishing. Due to the irregular nature of Yemeni coastguard forces, or the difficulty in identifying Eritrean craft (which are small speedboats), there are problems with merchant vessels misidentifying small patrol craft from Yemen and Eritrea as pirate vessels. Aggressive enforcement by

coastguard vessels, or local craft attempting to warn away merchant vessels, are possible threats in the area. The piracy threat is minimal, even in southern areas, as this area is now considered to be outside the operational range of Somali pirates. The fighting in Sudan is not expected to affect threat levels in the Red Sea.

## Threat levels

Refer to the section "Methodology / Definitions" for a definition of threat levels. A concise assessment of all threats listed in the table can be found on the Risk Intelligence System.

| Threat type                        | Threat level |
|------------------------------------|--------------|
| Terrorism                          | Moderate     |
| Piracy                             | Low          |
| Insurgency and Military Operations | High         |
| Cargo Theft                        | Moderate     |
| Smuggling                          | Elevated     |
| Stowaways and human trafficking    | Low          |
| Fraud and corruption               | Low          |
| Activism                           | Low          |

## Persian Gulf – threat assessment (summary)

This assessment covers the Persian Gulf maritime area, including the Strait of Hormuz and approaches through the Gulf of Oman. The primary maritime threat are actions taken or supported by Iran to threaten merchant ship transits or port and anchorage areas. The current threat level is broadly moderate to elevated, but higher for vessels linked to Israel given current developments in the escalating conflict between Iran and Israel. The situation is evolving and this threat assessment will be revised ongoing.

On 13 June 2025, Israel started a wave of strikes in Iran. Dozens of targets across Iran related to the nuclear programme and other military facilities in Tehran were struck by the Israeli Air Force. Israeli officials claimed that the goal was to damage Iran's nuclear programme and to respond to Iran's ongoing aggression against it. The ongoing conflict could have spillover effects for commercial maritime traffic but direct impacts are likely to remain limited. Iran has so far retaliated directly against Israel with drone and missile attacks. Additional Israeli and Iranian tit-for-tat strikes are expected, and Israel might expand its targeting of Iranian oil-related infrastructure. A primary consideration for the Iranians will be whether to affect disruptions on traffic in the Persian Gulf.

A principal concern is whether the US will participate in offensive actions on Iranian targets, which could prompt a maritime reaction by Iran in the Gulf. US military spokespersons have confirmed that the US military has been involved in assisting Israel against Iranian ballistic missile attacks. Iran has made threats against US military facilities in the region, but Iran needs to carefully balance any escalation with its desire to avoid clashes between its own troops and US forces.

In general, the situation between Iran and Israel remains the main potential flashpoint for further military operations. Internally, Iran is more likely to be managing the US' maximum pressure policy against the Iranian economy, which may lead to maritime tensions in the Gulf as the US seeks to enforce its sanctions. The US and Iran are engaging in diplomatic manoeuvres around nuclear talks, although it is uncertain an agreement will be reached - particular given the current deterioration in the political situation.

Tensions remain high between Israel and its rivals in the Axis of Resistance. It is expected that the Axis of Resistance will seek to retaliate to the Israelis' assassination of its political and military leaders, though what form the retaliation will take, and whether it will be in the maritime domain, is uncertain. The situation is not expected to escalate in the Persian Gulf, particularly north of the Strait of Hormuz, where neither Iran nor its rivals seek an escalation. The relative calm of the Persian Gulf is explained by its geographical distance from Israel and Palestine, as well as the substantial Chinese interest in maintaining unimpeded access to the region's ports. The ongoing Houthi campaign affecting commercial shipping through the Bab el Mandeb is not expected to reach to the Persian Gulf, despite Iranian support to the Houthis' operations.

The March 2023 deal between Saudi Arabia and Iran is expected to have a longer-term impact on threat levels in the Persian Gulf. It is possible that future Iranian actions will occur mainly south of the Strait of Hormuz, in an effort by the Iranians not to provoke Saudis. Seizure patterns since March 2023 support this assessment.



Aggressive enforcement by Iran of its waters is expected to continue. Surveillance, harassment and detentions of merchant vessels are frequent. This enforcement might be linked to specific goals, such as preventing fuel smuggling, but also to demonstrate naval capabilities. Seizure and detention of vessels might take place related to specific political and commercial disputes, and Iranian retaliation to incidents affecting its own shipping operations.

There has been an increase in naval patrolling in the area by a number of countries in response to the current threat situation, and this might also push Iran to consider alternative tactics. The US initiative of the International Maritime Security Construct (IMSC), headquartered in Bahrain, includes Coalition Task Force (CTF) Operation Sentinel to provide naval patrols and coordination for sea lanes in the area. This has improved the response options for any incidents. The EU also operates in the area with the European-led Maritime Awareness in the Strait of Hormuz (EMASoH), which includes a voluntary reporting scheme that aims to improve “cooperation and guidance that EMASoH can provide to ships on the basis of informing, reassuring, and promoting freedom of navigation.”

Other threats are low to moderate. Pirate groups are not present in the area, although low-level disputes between fishing fleets and criminal groups engaged in maritime crime are possible. There is also a substantial volume of local traffic, including small craft engaged in smuggling. These are often mistaken for other threats and may manoeuvre close to merchant vessels to use them as cover against detection by law enforcement, or to ‘warn away’ merchant vessels from their activities.


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| Fraud and corruption               | Low          |
| Activism                           | Low          |

## Methodology / Definitions

All threat levels are based on the likelihood of a threat type occurring, with generic consequences described in the relevant sections. All threat levels are based on an assessment of capabilities, intentions and opportunities of potential perpetrators, separated into different categories.



Maritime operators are typically unable to lower the threat level by influencing the underlying variables. However, all variables are subject to change over time, e.g. changes in the intentions or capabilities of potential perpetrators. They should therefore be re-assessed as required.

In an additional step, the threat levels assessed here can be used to identify the risk level for a particular type of operations. Determining the risk level also requires an assessment of the vulnerability and the potential consequence of a particular incident. Appropriate mitigation measures can then be implemented to lower the risk level.

### Threat levels

All threat levels mentioned above are assessed based on the likelihood and consequence of a particular threat type occurring. The levels are:

- Low: Not expected in the operational area or in proximity.
- Moderate: Not expected in the operational area but possible in proximity.
- Elevated: Possible in the operational area or in proximity.
- High: Expected in the operational area or in proximity.
- Severe: Commonplace in the operational area or in proximity.

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