

WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT | ISSUE NO. 50 (11 DECEMBER 2025)

# Northern Black Sea and Russia (Ports and Terminals)

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# About the report

This report provides an overview of the current maritime security situation in the northern part of the Black Sea, particularly in the vicinity of specific ports and terminals. It is primarily aimed at assessing the threat of security incidents affecting operations of merchant ships operating in this area.

Comprehensive descriptions for individual incidents as well as statistics about attacks against merchant ships are available on the Risk Intelligence System.

Time of latest intelligence included in this report:  
11 December 2025, 08:00 UTC.

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# Overview of current situation

## Summary

- The general threat picture for the Black Sea remains unchanged, but can change
- Ukraine targets 'shadow fleet' vessel in the Black Sea
- Ukrainian forces target Sea of Azov port and oil platform in the Caspian Sea
- Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian civilian infrastructure

## Brief update

Incidents and developments during the past week, do not change the current threat picture for the Black or the Caspian Sea.

The developments during the past week appear as a continuation of the incidents and developments reported last week. The attack on the claimed 'shadow fleet' vessel the DASHAN in the Black Sea is similar to the previous attacks undertaken by Ukrainian forces against the other two 'shadow fleet' vessels the KAIROS and the VIRAT – with the same modus operandi by Ukrainian forces to target the vessels with their naval drone capabilities. The MIDVOLGA-2 remains an outlier given the apparent use of an aerial drone and that Ukraine stating that Ukraine had nothing to do with this incident. Although, such statements cannot be verified or qualified, it is noteworthy given that Ukrainian forces have openly claimed responsibility for the other vessel incidents. As noted last week, given that Ukraine has now proven their capability of targeting vessels in transit to Russian ports in the wider Black Sea with, so far, no retaliation towards vessels in transit to Ukrainian ports – even though Russia reissued such threats. Ukraine is likely to continue to prove this capability and continue to target Russian 'shadow fleet' vessels, as part of its wider campaign by Ukrainian forces to target Russia's wider war effort. The targeting of commercial vessels, linked to Russia, by Ukrainian forces, is, currently, likely to continue to focus on 'shadow fleet' vessels, although there is no guarantee that the selected targeting will not change in the future.

The attack on the Filanovsky oil production platform in the Caspian Sea, also underlines the capability by Ukrainian forces to be able to undertake

such attacks. A previous attack in the Caspian, by Ukrainian forces, was in November 2024, on the Russian military port at Kaspiysk.

Diplomatic efforts have continued at pace during the past week, which has included the US presenting Christmas as a new deadline for Ukraine to commit to the US peace plan – although it is unclear which version of the peace-plan this deadline refers to. The current level of diplomatic and political activity is likely to continue until the deadline, and it is understood that there are currently three versions of a peace-plan approach, though it is not clear whether the three versions complement each other or are completely separate proposals.

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The current scenarios for vessel attacks are (order does not represent likelihood):

**Scenario 1:** The threat of collateral damage to vessels in both Ukrainian and Russian ports, remains the most likely, due to Russia's apparent disregard of damaging cargo vessels when targeting port infrastructure near civilian areas. However, collateral damage towards vessels transiting the Ukrainian Black Sea corridor, can also not be ruled out.

**Scenario 2:** Vessels can be targeted due to flawed intelligence from the Russian military, suggesting they carry military hardware.

**Scenario 3:** Russian attacks may be aimed at deterring vessels from using the Ukrainian transit corridor and disrupting maritime exports by creating uncertainty and danger.

**Scenario 4:** Russia could target vessels to increase pressure on Ukraine to influence future negotiations.

Regardless of Russian objectives, Ukrainian ports and their infrastructure remain likely targets, as part of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine.

## Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor

Vessel traffic using the Ukrainian Black Sea corridor during the past week is unclear. The threat to vessels in transit maybe be higher at present, following the recent Ukrainian attacks on Russian "shadow fleet" vessels, but the threat is still assessed lower compared to the threat of collateral damage to vessels in port, due to ongoing Russian attacks on Ukrainian port cities and infrastructure.

Strikes impacting vessels underway remain assessed as less likely to occur, as this would require direct targeting. Previous incidents involving vessels, indicate that the likelihood of collateral damage while in Ukrainian ports remain greater, but future incidents involving

commercial vessels – whether from collateral damage, debris, missile misidentification, or potential direct targeting – cannot be ruled out.

The Ukrainian Black Sea corridor and ports operate under IMO Circular Letter 4748 and local guidance, though operational differences should be expected.

Operational disruptions such as power outages and air raid alarms remain likely, until security improves. An elevated threat to maritime trade in the NW Black Sea and near the conflict area persists due to likely Russian actions against vessels and port infrastructure.

## Black Sea

Russian and Ukrainian military activity in the Black Sea, continue to pose a threat to shipping in the area as the Black Sea remains an active war zone. Future incidents should be expected throughout the Black Sea.

The latest incidents do underline the widening of the overall threat picture for operations in the Black Sea, with the security situation still varying locally. Although Ukrainian forces are unlikely to target non-‘shadow fleet’ vessels, including those transiting to Russian Black Sea ports, future expansion of target selection cannot be ruled out. Russia is still likely to retaliate in response to the recent Ukrainian attacks on Russia’s “shadow fleet” vessels. However, the retaliation is most likely to target Ukrainian drone production facilities and port infrastructure. But future attacks on commercial vessels on the basis of supporting the Ukrainian war effort, transporting weapons etc. cannot be ruled out. Potential harassment, AIS/GPS signal jamming or spoofing, and the use of warning shots also remain possible. Ukrainian forces are expected to continue pressuring Russian forces in the Black Sea, including in and near Crimea, in order to achieve greater control over the maritime domain to secure the shipping in the area.

Russia, despite reduced naval capabilities in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, maintains a presence that can deploy mines or munitions into the Black Sea. Submarine deployment will be influenced by Ukrainian anti-ship capabilities. However, under current conditions, Russia is unlikely to enforce any blockade or inspection regime in the north-western Black Sea. The usage of naval drones, both on surface and submerged is likely to continue to increase by both sides, the deployment, as part of military operations, for the foreseeable future.

Mine Countermeasure (MCM) operations conducted by Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Ukraine, are ongoing to address the threat of sea mines that persists in the wider Black Sea. War-related implications, such as varying degrees of naval presence, congestion at regional straits and ports, sanctions on trade to and from Russia, and complications with crew changes, have become more common since

Russia's withdrawal from the UN-backed Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023.

## Sea of Azov

The Sea of Azov is largely restricted for commercial traffic without Russian consent. Mariupol and Berdyansk ports, controlled by Russian forces, have unclear operational statuses. Reports indicate stolen Ukrainian cargo is being transported from these ports.

Ukraine monitors vessels to occupied ports in the Sea of Azov and may consider them potential military targets. Russia has increased defences around the Crimea bridge due to Ukrainian strikes. Non-Russian-flagged vessels can face disruption in the Kerch Strait, and Russia may prohibit vessels loaded outside its territory from transiting. Attacks on Russian Black Sea ports operating at ISPS level 2 are probable.

## Ukraine

Port information is located in the port table.

The direct targeting of vessels remains possible, although collateral damage is the most likely threat to materialise. This is similar for all of Ukrainian ports.

Power-outages and air-raid alarms continue throughout the country, which can also disrupt port operations. Russian attacks on Ukrainian power infrastructure is likely intended to cause as much damage before winter as possible. Therefore, concerns regarding the operational future of the country's energy network, including sufficient supplies and making the network more resilient to aerial attacks remain. Given the constant unpredictability, future disruption should be expected.

Until any form of a ceasefire is agreed and enforced, Russia is likely to use any pretext for future attacks on Black Sea maritime operations, if deemed useful to achieve their military or political objectives.

Martial law remains in place with some local night-time curfews. All Ukrainian ports are operating at ISPS level 3 following the communication to the IMO by the Ukrainian authorities.

## Russia

Port information is located in the port table.

Ukrainian forces continue military activity in the Black Sea, with numerous Russian reports of engagements with unmanned naval drones and special forces in the NW Black Sea. There are also reports of USVs reaching as far as Novorossiysk - as well as reports of attacks across Crimea.

Recent Ukrainian targeting of cargo vessels will likely be limited in the future to a target-profile fitting that of so-called "shadow-fleet" vessels, i.e. vessels that are directly controlled by Moscow or have an affiliation to Russia via ownership or operator. Vessels otherwise engaged in

trading Russian energy products, even in line with sanctions and price cap, are not likely targets, but are likely to be “named and shamed” via Ukrainian government and media channels.

The introduction of long-range Ukrainian produced missiles, “flamingos”, may lead to strikes against Russian ports in the Black Sea, including against military assets and energy infrastructure. The same is likely if Ukraine is provided with other long-range weapon systems or assistance with targeting inside Russia.

Previous videos of naval and aerial drone attacks in Russian ports also highlight a general lack of advanced counter measures. Russian anti-air is often fired at near horizontal angles. This is likely to lead to damage to port facilities and vessels and may potentially also wound or kill sailors or port workers.

When using Russian ports other than those in the Black Sea, for example Arctic or Baltic Sea ports, it is possible that Russian authorities will try to recruit or coerce crews on visiting vessels with non-Russian flag or crew, to conduct espionage or reconnaissance on their behalf, or even sabotage of undersea cables by releasing the anchor and dragging it across cables or pipelines. Such cases of recruitment have not been confirmed, but it is possible given the ongoing Russian hybrid effort in the Baltic Sea, and the requirement for plausible deniability.

There have been a number of incidents of vessels being hit by explosions, likely due to limpet mines, after these vessels have called Russian ports, or during Russian port calls. While the circumstances are unclear, it is a possibility that Ukrainian special forces and intelligence units are part of a wider campaign of mining vessels calling Russian ports.

## Conflict outlook

The attack on the DASHAN, claimed by Ukrainian forces, following the two similar attacks last week, further underlines the capability and willingness by Ukraine to target Russia’s ability to continue its oil trade to sustain its war effort. Similar future attacks are likely, with the targeting of Russia linked ‘shadow-fleet’ vessels the most likely targets – although a widening of target selection, if deemed appropriate by Ukraine, cannot be ruled out. It is also likely that Russia, if Ukraine continues to increase the pressure on Russia’s ability to continue to export oil via the Black Sea, will retaliate by attempting to inflict similar pressure on Ukraine’s own ability to undertake maritime exports. Under current circumstances this is most likely to include increased targeting of port related infrastructure – including while vessels are in port, to increase the likelihood of collateral damage. A tactic which Russian forces have used before.



Diplomatic efforts are currently very intense and fast moving with multiple political aspirations attempting to influence the process and possible outcome. However, there is still room for both significant and no development between now and the current deadline of Christmas, as stated by the US. Although this deadline may also be postponed or ignored, as the previous deadline, Thanksgiving, was.

**Annex 1 – Illustration of reported mined areas**

**Annex 2 – Announced temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports**

**Annex 3 – Reported Kerch Strait inspection area**

**Annex 4 – List of commercial vessel incidents**

**Annex 5 – Incidents**

# Ukraine and northern Black Sea ports

Port	Current port situation	Current local situation	Operations	Security
<b>Odesa</b>	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes do occur against critical infrastructure in the Odesa Oblast, including some direct targeting of Odesa city and port. Future attacks targeting Odesa port cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations may occur due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
<b>Pivdenny</b>	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes have occurred against targets in and near Pivdenny in the past, including targeting of the port. Future targeting in the area as part of military operations cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations may occur due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
<b>Mykolaiv</b>	Closed. Cargo operations suspended for commercial operations.	In control of Ukrainian forces. Russian strikes against military targets and critical-infrastructure targets in or near the city do occur.		
<b>Mariupol</b>	Disputed operational status.	Controlled by Russian forces and part of annexed territory. Actual operational status is disputed with Russian authorities reporting the port to be open, although this is with very limited traffic prioritized by the Russian state. Reports indicate the rebuilding of the port facilities by Russian military and contractors.		
<b>Chornomorsk</b>	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes have occurred against critical infrastructure in the Odessa Oblast. Future attacks targeting Chornomorsk port cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations may occur due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
<b>Ukraine Danube ports</b>	Ukraine Danube ports are operating and handling ship calls via the Danube, and the Sulina and Bystre Canals.	Incidents involving mines have occurred in the Black Sea near the canals. Russian strikes against the ports in the Izmail region, do occur. Local weather conditions, water levels, and pilot shortages also impact maritime operations. ISPS Level 3 is in place, as communicated by the Ukrainian authorities. Delays and congestion have been reported in relation to port and canal operations.		

\* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts.

\*\* Risk Intelligence is not responsible for third-party content.

Port	Current port situation	Current local situation	Operations	Security
<b>Kerch Strait</b>	Open for navigation but only for authorized transit. Ports located within the Strait are reported to be operating. Inspection regime and additional security measures are in place.	UKR naval drone or missile strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge and nearby naval stations and critical infrastructure remain possible. Attacks are not expected to directly target commercial maritime traffic, but collateral damage cannot be ruled out. Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Russia has announced transit restriction of vessels which are not loaded in Russian ports. Scrutiny against crew is possible *. See Annex 3 for reported Kerch Strait inspection area.		
<b>Russian Black Sea ports</b>	Open with restrictions. Additional security measures are in place.	Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones, aerial drones, or cruise missiles, is possible. Collateral damage from drones may occur in case of incidents, and Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Scrutiny against crew is possible *.		
<b>Russian Sea of Azov ports</b>	Open with restrictions. Sea of Azov is currently closed to unauthorized navigation by the Russian authorities. Additional security measures are in place.	Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones, aerial drones or cruise missiles, is possible. Collateral damage from drones may occur in case of incidents, and Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Scrutiny against crew is possible *.		
<b>Temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports</b>	Operational status is reported to be open, in accordance with IMO Circular Letter 4748 – though likely influenced by local operational circumstances in the NW Black Sea.	The corridor is reported to be running without considerable issues, although disruption following attacks are to be expected. Any tacit agreement from Russia on current transits are unknown, and further Russian acceptance is unclear if the increased tempo of Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in the Black Sea continues. Military activity in and near the corridor is possible, collateral damage to vessels is possible.		
<b>Constanta</b>	Open.	Operating, with additional cargo diverted to Constanta due to closed Ukrainian ports. Congestion should be expected, and although this is being managed, it could lead to delays.		

\* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts.

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# Operations and Security definitions

## Operations

**Green** – Operations in the area are ongoing normally with no significant issues.

**Yellow** – Some delays or disruptions in the area may be expected, which could be due to limitations to, for example, port operations and/or congestion in the area, or other difficulties with access or operating at the required ISPS level or complying with other procedures either at port or offshore.

**Red** – Operations have been significantly disrupted and ports or areas might be closed or only partially operating due to restrictions, blockades, lack of functioning infrastructure, personnel disruptions, and access concerns, or other issues preventing all or most operations.

## Security

**Green** – The area is secure and there are no direct or indirect security threats in the port vicinity or offshore area. Low threat to vessels/personnel.

**Yellow** – There are no direct security threats but there are possible indirect threats in the vicinity, particularly but not limited to conflict taking place in proximity either on land or offshore. Moderate threat to vessels/personnel.

**Red** – Direct threats are possible to the port or area and/or its immediate approaches, including collateral damage in the immediate area or direct attacks that could target infrastructure and vessels at berth/anchorages/underway. High threat to vessels/personnel.

## Note on sanctions and commercial restrictions

Sanctions and commercial restrictions are being imposed on Russia in response to its invasion. These sanctions are evolving and will affect ongoing business operations in many complex legal ways. Sanctions are being applied to individual Russians, business entities, and to certain Russian export products (such as oil products). There are also restrictions on specific nationalities (such as US citizens) engaging in certain activities, restrictions on payments (in certain currencies and through certain institutions), and restrictions on Russia's import of particular dual-use items and technologies. Port entry bans for Russian vessels are being implemented (in the UK, for example).

The fine print of sanctions and restrictions might affect chartering arrangements in unexpected ways, depending on the connection to Russia. These issues, as well as insurance issues for operating in war

risk areas, are not covered in this report and might need to be assessed separately to reduce the risk of exposure.

# Annex 1 - Illustration of reported mined areas



Image 1 - Risk Intelligence (Illustration for visual guidance only)


NAVAREA III: See above for visual guidance on mined areas according to the Spanish flag administration (NAVAREA III 0092).

Mined areas are most likely a combination of deeper sea mines and shallow water mines for anti-amphibious operations as well as on beaches. Mines in the sea are most likely cabled or anchored and under control.

Please also note that active NAVAREA III warnings include a warning of possible drifting mines (NAVAREA III 0122) for Northwest, West, and Southwest areas of the Black Sea.




# Annex 2 - Announced temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports



The above chart shows the announced temporary routes for civilian vessels to and from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. The Ukrainian Navy emphasizes that war risks, including mines, remain. Further details can be found in the IMO Circular Letter No.4748 (Source: IMO Illustration for visual guidance only)

# Annex 3- Reported Kerch Strait inspection area



Reported Kerch Strait inspection area, as announced by the Russian authorities 02 August 2023.



# Annex 4 – List of commercial vessel incidents

Date	Name of ship	Type	Flag
10 DEC 2025	DASHAN	Crude Oil	Unknown
02 DEC 2025	MIDVOLGA-2	Chemical Tanker	Russia
28 NOV 2025	KAIROS	Crude Oil	Gambia
28 NOV 2025	VIRAT	Crude Oil	Gambia
17 NOV 2025	ORINDA	Tanker	Turkey
14 NOV 2025	ARIAN	Tanker	Sierra Leon
31 AUG 2025	NS PRIDE	Bulk carrier	Belize
11 MAR 2025	MJ PINAR	Bulk carrier	Barbados
01 MAR 2025	SUPER SARKAS	Bulk carrier	Siera Leone
01 MAR 2025	MSC LEVANTE F	Container ship	Panama

# Annex 5 – Incidents

# RiskIntelligence

## Ukrainian forces target Sea of Azov port

**December 5 2025**

**Region: Europe**

A Ukrainian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack reportedly targeted Temryuk port, Russia in the early hours of 05 December 2025.

The incident took place at: 45:19.35N 037:22.82E.

Multiple reports indicate that following the UAV strike, fires broke out involving fuel tanks. Emergency services were deployed to contain the fires. No casualties were reported.

Update: According to Ukraine's SBU service, the strike destroyed 20 tanks, or two-thirds of on-site storage capacity.

The Maktren-Nafta LPG terminal has a total of 30 storage tanks for up to 6,000 tonnes of LPG storage. It was built by Ukrainian contractor Ukgazproekt prior to the war, and was the first purpose-built transshipment terminal of its kind in Russia.

## Crude oil tanker DASHAN reportedly targeted with drone

**December 10 2025**

**Region: Europe**

The Unknown-flagged crude oil tanker DASHAN was reportedly struck by a naval drone 85 NM north of Sinop, Türkiye, on 10 December 2025.

The incident occurred in approximately location 43:35N 035:00E.

The incident, which involves a vessel which had been sanctioned by several Western entities, allegedly occurred within Ukraine's exclusive economic zone. The DASHAN was travelling at full speed to the port of Novorossiysk when it was targeted. Ukraine has taken credit for the attack claiming that its sea drones departed from Odesa to intercept the DASHAN. The vessel has sustained critical damage and is currently disabled.

The vessel has been claimed to have been both Comorros and Gambian-flagged, but no official flag is registered since she was stricken from Comoros register in September 2025.

The 164,608 DWT vessel is managed by Reef Marine Inc of Victoria, Seychelles.

## Ukraine reports strike on Caspian Sea offshore installation

**December 11 2025**

**Region: Europe**

Ukraine has claimed a drone attack on a Russian offshore installation in the Caspian Sea, Russia at an unknown time on 11 December 2025.

According to media reports, citing official Ukrainian sources, the strike was directed against the Filanovsky oil production platform and was carried out by aerial drones.

The sources claim four hits were registered.



# Knowing Risk

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