



WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT | ISSUE NO. 01 (08 JANUARY 2026)

Northern Black Sea and Russia (Ports and Terminals)

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Advisory Services
Intelligence Reports

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About the report

This report provides an overview of the current maritime security situation in the northern part of the Black Sea, particularly in the vicinity of specific ports and terminals. It is primarily aimed at assessing the threat of security incidents affecting operations of merchant ships operating in this area.

Comprehensive descriptions for individual incidents as well as statistics about attacks against merchant ships are available on the Risk Intelligence System.

Time of latest intelligence included in this report:
08 January 2026, 08:00 UTC.

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Overview of current situation

Summary

- The general threat picture for the Black Sea remains unchanged
- Ukrainian forces continue the campaign against Russian energy export infrastructure, including ports
- Russian forces continue to target Ukrainian civilian infrastructure
- Vessels were damaged as the result of military operations during the reporting period

Brief update

Incidents and developments since 23 December 2025, do not change the current threat picture for the Black Sea.

The developments during the past two weeks are mainly a continuation of established priorities and campaigns of Ukraine and Russia in the Black Sea, with no apparent changes.

Recent negotiation efforts over the Christmas and New Years period, as well as the early-January discussions in Paris, are unlikely to yield results. Russia is highly unlikely to accept any solution with Western military forces in Ukraine as part of a security guarantee. Russian domestic signalling from the Kremlin further indicate that the maximalist war aims of a demilitarized Ukrainian rump state, remain an achievable and reasonable end goal. Because of this, the conflict is likely to continue as before.

Russian forces targeted Ukrainian ports over the past two weeks, and one strike on a vessel underway to the Odesa ports was reported. The strike on the vessel is assessed to not be a change in Russian targeting priorities. While it is assessed that the main Russian bombing effort remains focused on energy infrastructure, there are some indicators of maritime infrastructure taking a higher priority over the Christmas and New Years periods. Russia will most likely continue to focus their bombings on critical power and heating infrastructure in Ukraine, to increase the misery of the Ukrainian people over the Winter months.

Ukrainian large-scale attacks on Russian energy export infrastructure continued over the reporting period, with the main effort directed against land-targets rather than maritime infrastructure.

There are reports of a vessel hit by some type of drone in the Turkish EEZ 25NM off the coast on 07 January. Details of type of drone and damage to vessel are scarce and unconfirmed at the time of latest intelligence for this report. Because of this, the nature of the incident and how it fits into the wider threat picture cannot be assessed with confidence.

As may be the case of the incident mentioned above - Ukraine may continue to target Russian "shadow-fleet" vessels. However, it is uncertain to what degree the December strikes were a limited campaign to influence the peace negotiations at the time, or part of a wider effort. It is also possible that the lack of renewed strikes in late December has been due to poor weather, limiting the use of aerial and naval drones. The targeting of commercial vessels is likely to focus mainly on vessels with direct ties to Moscow via ownership or similar, although there is no guarantee that the selected targeting will not change in the future. Strikes against maritime energy export infrastructure, including terminals and ports, are very likely to continue.

Russia and Ukraine are both likely to continue to engage with the US to place their respective views at the forefront of the US approach. Even though Ukraine has repeatedly stated its readiness to agree to various proposals for either a ceasefire or an initial peace settlement, Russia is unlikely to do so as long as it believes it can achieve its military ambitions.

The current scenarios for vessel attacks are (order does not represent likelihood):

Scenario 1: The threat of collateral damage to vessels in both Ukrainian and Russian ports, remains the most likely, due to the targeting of ports and terminals by both sides. However, collateral damage towards vessels transiting the Ukrainian Black Sea corridor, can also not be ruled out.

Scenario 2: Vessels can be targeted due to flawed intelligence from the Russian military, suggesting they carry military hardware.

Scenario 3: Russian attacks may be aimed at deterring vessels from using the Ukrainian transit corridor and disrupting maritime exports by creating uncertainty and danger.

Scenario 4: Russia could target vessels to increase pressure on Ukraine to influence future negotiations.

Scenario 5: Ukraine may target vessels with ties to Moscow and the Russian military to increase pressure on the Russian economy. Strikes on neutral shipping are unlikely.

Regardless of objectives, ports, terminals, and their supporting infrastructure remain likely targets, as part of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine.

Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor

Vessel traffic continued through the Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor over the reporting period. The threat to vessels in transit may be higher at present, following Ukrainian attacks on Russian "shadow-fleet" vessels, and potential Russian retaliation, but the threat is still assessed lower compared to the threat of collateral damage to vessels in port.

The targeting of the CAPTAIN KARAM off the Sulina channel on 30 December has not been followed up by other strikes and, for now, seems to be a singular event rather an indicator of a shift in Russian operations.

If Ukraine persist in attacking Russian shipping in the Black Sea, Russia may respond in-kind by attacking vessels directly while underway in the Ukrainian EEZ – like the CAPTAIN KARAM. Still, previous incidents involving vessels, indicate that the likelihood of collateral damage while in Ukrainian ports remain greater. Future incidents involving commercial vessels – whether from collateral damage, debris, missile misidentification, or potential direct targeting – cannot be ruled out.

The Ukrainian Black Sea corridor and ports operate under IMO Circular Letter 4748 and local guidance, though operational differences should be expected.

Operational disruptions such as power outages and air-raids or air-raid alarms remain likely, until security improves. An elevated threat to maritime trade in the NW Black Sea and near the conflict area persists due to likely Russian actions against vessels and port infrastructure.

Black Sea

Russian and Ukrainian military activity continue to pose a threat to shipping as the Black Sea remains an active war zone. Future incidents should be expected throughout the Black Sea.

The latest incidents do underline the widening of the overall threat picture for operations in the Black Sea, with the security situation still varying locally.

There are reports of the crude oil tanker ELBUS being hit by some type of drone in the Turkish EEZ on 07 January. Details of type of drone and damage to vessel are scarce, and unconfirmed at the time of latest intelligence for this report. Some reporting indicate damage to the upper sections of the vessel, and other sources indicate damage to the engine room and rudder. The difference may indicate the type of drone used – aerial or naval – which remain uncertain at this point. It is also uncertain if the crew spotted a drone beforehand, heard engine noises, or if the drone was discovered on approach before the vessel was hit.

The ELBUS fits the profile of a “shadow-fleet” tanker with obscure ownerships and trading Russian oil, and therefore also fits the Ukrainian target profile for striking vessels in the Black Sea. There have been no comments on the incident from Ukraine. This may be due to the vessel being hit deep in the Turkish EEZ, and Ukraine wanting to keep themselves distanced to that kind of operations in case of Turkish reactions.

It is also possible, although unlikely, that the ELBUS incident is the result of a drifting mine or disabled Ukrainian naval drone, and that the incident was a coincidental collision triggering the explosive device, rather than a targeted attack.

For regular attacks on vessels, Ukrainian forces are unlikely to target non- “shadow-fleet” vessels, including those transiting to Russian Black Sea ports, future expansion of target selection cannot be ruled out.

Russia is still likely to retaliate in response to any Ukrainian attacks on “shadow-fleet” vessels. The retaliation is most likely to target Ukrainian drone production facilities, drone support facilities, and port infrastructure, although future attacks on commercial vessels as retaliation are possible.

Potential harassment, AIS/GPS signal jamming or spoofing, and the use of warning shots also remain possible. Ukrainian forces are expected to continue pressuring Russian forces in the Black Sea, including in and near Crimea, in order to achieve greater control over the maritime domain to secure the shipping in the area.

Russia, despite reduced naval capabilities in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov, maintains a presence that can deploy mines or munitions into the Black Sea. Submarine deployment will be influenced by Ukrainian anti-ship capabilities. However, under current conditions, Russia is unlikely to enforce any blockade or inspection regime in the north-western Black Sea. The usage of naval drones, both on surface and submerged is likely to continue to increase by both sides, the deployment, as part of military operations, for the foreseeable future.

Mine Countermeasure (MCM) operations conducted by Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Ukraine, are ongoing to address the threat of sea mines that persists in the wider Black Sea. War-related implications, such as varying degrees of naval presence, congestion at regional straits and ports, sanctions on trade to and from Russia, and complications with crew changes, have become more common since Russia's withdrawal from the UN-backed Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023.

Sea of Azov

The Sea of Azov is largely restricted for commercial traffic without Russian consent. Mariupol and Berdyansk ports, controlled by Russian

forces, have unclear operational statuses. Reports indicate stolen Ukrainian cargo is being transported from these ports.

Ukraine monitors vessels to occupied ports in the Sea of Azov and may consider them potential military targets.

Russia has increased defences around the Crimea bridge due to Ukrainian strikes. Non-Russian-flagged vessels can face disruption in the Kerch Strait, and Russia may prohibit vessels loaded outside its territory from transiting. Attacks on Russian Black Sea ports operating at ISPS level 2 are probable.

Ukraine

Port information is located in the port table.

The direct targeting of vessels remains possible, although collateral damage is the most likely threat to materialise. This is similar for all of Ukrainian ports.

Aside from the CAPTAIN KARIM-incident, it is assessed that the damage to vessels over the past reporting period are results of collateral damage during port strikes, rather than incidents of direct targeting of vessels. It is assessed that the CAPTAIN KARIM strike remains an outlier, especially given the lack of follow-up attacks. Russian strikes on ports are likely to continue to occur, although the main Russian effort is likely to focus on energy and heating infrastructure.

Power-outages and air-raids continue throughout the country, which routinely disrupt port operations. Russian attacks on Ukrainian power infrastructure are likely intended to cause as much damage during Winter as possible. Therefore, concerns regarding the operational future of the country's energy network, including sufficient supplies and making the network more resilient to aerial attacks remain. Given the constant unpredictability, future disruption should be expected.

Until any form of a ceasefire is agreed and enforced, Russia is likely to use any pretext for future attacks on Black Sea maritime operations, if deemed useful to achieve their military or political objectives.

Martial law remains in place with some local night-time curfews. All Ukrainian ports are operating at ISPS level 3 following the communication to the IMO by the Ukrainian authorities.

Russia

Port information is located in the port table.

Ukrainian forces continue military activity in the Black Sea, with numerous Russian reports of engagements with unmanned naval and aerial drones and special forces. Ukrainian unmanned systems, both naval and aerial, are now sophisticated enough to be able to reach all Russian territorial waters in the Black Sea. During times of poor weather,

i.e. storms and similar, the likelihood of long-range naval drone operations occurring is lowered considerably. Therefore, the tempo of operations during winter might prove to be lower than in the last months of 2025.

Recent Ukrainian targeting of cargo vessels will likely be limited in the future to a target-profile fitting that of so-called “shadow-fleet” vessels, i.e. vessels that are directly controlled by Moscow or have an affiliation to Russia via ownership or operator. Vessels otherwise engaged in trading Russian energy products, even in line with sanctions and price cap, are not likely targets, but are likely to be “named and shamed” via Ukrainian government and media channels. This includes vessels trading Kazakh oil by calling the CPC terminal at Novorossiysk.

The introduction of long-range Ukrainian produced missiles, “flamingos”, may lead to prolonged strikes against Russian ports in the Black Sea, including against military assets and energy infrastructure. The same is likely if Ukraine is provided with other long-range weapon systems or assistance with targeting inside Russia.

Previous videos of naval and aerial drone attacks in Russian ports also highlight a general lack of advanced counter measures. Russian anti-air is often fired at near horizontal angles. This is likely to lead to damage to port facilities and vessels and may potentially also wound or kill sailors or port workers.

When using Russian ports in Russia, both in the Black Sea, but also Arctic or Baltic Sea ports, it is possible that Russian authorities will try to recruit or coerce crews on visiting vessels with non-Russian flag or crew, to conduct espionage or reconnaissance on their behalf, or even sabotage of undersea cables by releasing the anchor and dragging it across cables or pipelines. Such cases of recruitment have not been confirmed, but it is possible given the ongoing Russian hybrid effort in the Baltic Sea, and the requirement for plausible deniability. Russian military or government inserting operators as part of crew or on vessels are also possible.

There have been a number of incidents of vessels being hit by explosions, likely due to limpet mines, after these vessels have called Russian ports, or during Russian port calls. While the circumstances are unclear, it is a possibility that Ukrainian special forces and intelligence units are part of a wider campaign of mining vessels calling Russian ports.

Conflict outlook

Ukrainian attacks on maritime targets in the Black Sea and nearby regions are likely to continue. Oil and energy export facilities likely remain the central targets for the Ukrainian bombing campaigns,

although strikes against Russian and Kremlin-aligned vessels may occur. This is most likely to be focused on naval vessels or Kremlin-affiliated “shadow-fleet” vessels, and neutral shipping are unlikely to be targeted, although a widening of target selection, if deemed appropriate by Ukraine, cannot be ruled out.

Naval drone attacks are likely to be heavily influenced by winter-weather conditions, and poor weather, storms, and similar, may limit the potential for Ukrainian naval drone operations.

It is likely that Russia, if Ukraine continues to increase the pressure on Russia’s ability to continue to export oil via the Black Sea, will retaliate by attempting to inflict similar pressure on Ukraine’s own ability to undertake maritime exports. Under current circumstances this is most likely to include increased targeting of port related infrastructure – including while vessels are in port. This also increases the likelihood for collateral damage.

Attacks against vessels may occur as a “like-for-like” response, and such attacks may include strikes on neutral shipping calling Ukrainian ports.

While strikes on ports and maritime transport infrastructure may occur, it remains the assessment that Russia will continue to mainly focus bombings on critical power and heating infrastructure in Ukraine, to increase the misery of the Ukrainian people over the Winter months. This has proven to be a central Russian strategy over the past years of war, and the main effort will continue in this manner. Any strikes on ports or maritime infrastructure are likely only for signalling purposes, or to hit high-value targets, rather than a change in operational priorities.

Russia and Ukraine are both likely to continue to engage with the US in an attempt to place their respective views at the forefront of the US approach. Recent negotiation efforts are unlikely to yield results, as Russia are unlikely to accept Western military forces in Ukraine as part of a security guarantee.

Until there are firm indications of all parties decidedly moving in a unified direction towards any ceasefire or peace settlement, the current situation is likely to continue. By extension, the overall threat picture for the Black Sea will also likely remain unchanged.

Annex 1 – Illustration of reported mined areas

Annex 2 – Announced temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports

Annex 3 – Reported Kerch Strait inspection area

Annex 4 – List of commercial vessel incidents

Annex 5 – Incidents

Ukraine and northern Black Sea ports

Port	Current port situation	Current local situation	Operations	Security
Odesa	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes do occur against critical infrastructure in the Odesa Oblast, including some direct targeting of Odesa city and port. Future attacks targeting Odesa port cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
Pivdenny	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes have occurred against targets in and near Pivdenny in the past, including targeting of the port. Future targeting in the area as part of military operations cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
Mykolaiv	Closed. Cargo operations suspended for commercial operations.	In control of Ukrainian forces. Russian strikes against military targets and critical-infrastructure targets in or near the city do occur.		
Mariupol	Disputed operational status.	Controlled by Russian forces and part of annexed territory. Actual operational status is disputed with Russian authorities reporting the port to be open, although this is with very limited traffic prioritized by the Russian state. Reports indicate the rebuilding of the port facilities by Russian military and contractors.		
Chornomorsk	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes have occurred against critical infrastructure in the Odessa Oblast. Future attacks targeting Chornomorsk port cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
Ukraine Danube ports	Ukraine Danube ports are operating and handling ship calls via the Danube, and the Sulina and Bystre Canals.	Incidents involving mines have occurred in the Black Sea near the canals. Russian strikes against the ports in the Izmail region, do occur. Local weather conditions, water levels, and pilot shortages also impact maritime operations. ISPS Level 3 is in place, as communicated by the Ukrainian authorities. Delays and congestion have been reported in relation to port and canal operations.		

* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts.

** Risk Intelligence is not responsible for third-party content.

Port	Current port situation	Current local situation	Operations	Security
Kerch Strait	Open for navigation but only for authorized transit. Ports located within the Strait are reported to be operating. Inspection regime and additional security measures are in place.	UKR naval drone or missile strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge and nearby naval stations and critical infrastructure remain possible. Attacks are not expected to directly target commercial maritime traffic, but collateral damage cannot be ruled out. Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Russia has announced transit restriction of vessels which are not loaded in Russian ports. Scrutiny against crew is possible *. See Annex 3 for reported Kerch Strait inspection area.		
Russian Black Sea ports	Open with restrictions. Additional security measures are in place.	Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones, aerial drones, or cruise missiles, is possible. Collateral damage from drones may occur in case of incidents, and Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Scrutiny against crew is possible *.		
Russian Sea of Azov ports	Open with restrictions. Sea of Azov is currently closed to unauthorized navigation by the Russian authorities. Additional security measures are in place.	Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones, aerial drones or cruise missiles, is possible. Collateral damage from drones may occur in case of incidents, and Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Scrutiny against crew is possible *.		
Temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports	Operational status is reported to be open, in accordance with IMO Circular Letter 4748 – though likely influenced by local operational circumstances in the NW Black Sea.	The corridor is reported to be running without considerable issues, although disruption following attacks are to be expected. Any tacit agreement from Russia on current transits are unknown, and further Russian acceptance is unclear if the increased tempo of Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in the Black Sea continues. Military activity in and near the corridor is possible, collateral damage to vessels is possible.		
Constanta	Open.	Operating, with additional cargo diverted to Constanta due to closed Ukrainian ports. Congestion should be expected, and although this is being managed, it could lead to delays.		

* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts.

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Operations and Security definitions

Operations

Green – Operations in the area are ongoing normally with no significant issues.

Yellow – Some delays or disruptions in the area may be expected, which could be due to limitations to, for example, port operations and/or congestion in the area, or other difficulties with access or operating at the required ISPS level or complying with other procedures either at port or offshore.

Red – Operations have been significantly disrupted and ports or areas might be closed or only partially operating due to restrictions, blockades, lack of functioning infrastructure, personnel disruptions, and access concerns, or other issues preventing all or most operations.

Security

Green – The area is secure and there are no direct or indirect security threats in the port vicinity or offshore area. Low threat to vessels/personnel.

Yellow – There are no direct security threats but there are possible indirect threats in the vicinity, particularly but not limited to conflict taking place in proximity either on land or offshore. Moderate threat to vessels/personnel.

Red – Direct threats are possible to the port or area and/or its immediate approaches, including collateral damage in the immediate area or direct attacks that could target infrastructure and vessels at berth/anchorages/underway. High threat to vessels/personnel.

Note on sanctions and commercial restrictions

Sanctions and commercial restrictions are being imposed on Russia in response to its invasion. These sanctions are evolving and will affect ongoing business operations in many complex legal ways. Sanctions are being applied to individual Russians, business entities, and to certain Russian export products (such as oil products). There are also restrictions on specific nationalities (such as US citizens) engaging in certain activities, restrictions on payments (in certain currencies and through certain institutions), and restrictions on Russia's import of particular dual-use items and technologies. Port entry bans for Russian vessels are being implemented (in the UK, for example).

The fine print of sanctions and restrictions might affect chartering arrangements in unexpected ways, depending on the connection to Russia. These issues, as well as insurance issues for operating in war

risk areas, are not covered in this report and might need to be assessed separately to reduce the risk of exposure.

Annex 1 - Illustration of reported mined areas





Image 1 - Risk Intelligence (Illustration for visual guidance only)

NAVAREA III: See above for visual guidance on mined areas according to the Spanish flag administration (NAVAREA III 0092).

Mined areas are most likely a combination of deeper sea mines and shallow water mines for anti-amphibious operations as well as on beaches. Mines in the sea are most likely cabled or anchored and under control.


Please also note that active NAVAREA III warnings include a warning of possible drifting mines (NAVAREA III 0122) for Northwest, West, and Southwest areas of the Black Sea.

Annex 2 - Announced temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports



The above chart shows the announced temporary routes for civilian vessels to and from Ukrainian Black Sea ports. The Ukrainian Navy emphasizes that war risks, including mines, remain. Further details can be found in the IMO Circular Letter No.4748 (Source: IMO Illustration for visual guidance only)

Annex 3- Reported Kerch Strait inspection area



Reported Kerch Strait inspection area, as announced by the Russian authorities 02 August 2023.

Annex 4 – List of commercial vessel incidents

Date	Name of ship	Type	Flag
07 JAN 2026	ELBUS	Crude oil	Palau
30 DEC 2025	CAPTAIN KARAM	Bulk carrier	Panama
23 DEC 2025	ANKA	General cargo	Tanzania
19 DEC 2025	QENDIL	Crude oil	OMAN
18 DEC 2025	VALERIY GORCHAKOV	Tanker	Russia
13 DEC 2025	VIVA	Chemical tanker	Tuvalu
12 DEC 2025	CENK T	Ro-Ro	Turkey
10 DEC 2025	DASHAN	Crude Oil	Unknown
02 DEC 2025	MIDVOLGA-2	Chemical Tanker	Russia
28 NOV 2025	KAIROS	Crude Oil	Gambia

28 NOV 2025	VIRAT	Crude Oil	Gambia
17 NOV 2025	ORINDA	Tanker	Turkey
14 NOV 2025	ARIAN	Tanker	Sierra Leon
31 AUG 2025	NS PRIDE	Bulk carrier	Belize
11 MAR 2025	MJ PINAR	Bulk carrier	Barbados
01 MAR 2025	SUPER SARKAS	Bulk carrier	Siera Leone
01 MAR 2025	MSC LEVANTE F	Container ship	Panama

Annex 5 – Incidents

RiskIntelligence

Crude oil tanker ELBUS reports drone attack

januar 7 2026

Region: Europe

The Palau-flagged crude oil tanker ELBUS reported a drone attack off Inebolu, Turkey in the Black Sea at 13:00 LT (10:00 UTC) on 07 January 2026.

The incident took place at: 42:23N 034:17E.

The tanker was in ballast en route from Singapore to Novorossiysk when it experienced an unmanned marine-vehicle and drone attack targeting the engine room and propeller and rudder units area, according to a report from Lloyd's. The tanker requested assistance from the Turkish coastguard and was diverted to Inebolu. Damage is being assessed but there were no crew casualties or pollution reported.

The 159,062 DWT vessel has Mei Zhou Dao Shipmanagement Company Limited, China as technical managers.

RiskIntelligence

Port of Pivdenny hit in Russian strike

januar 7 2026

Region: Europe

The port of Pivdenny, Ukraine, was hit in a Russian strike at an unknown time on 07 January 2026.

According to local sources a combined missile and drone attack cause both fatalities and unknown damage to port infrastructure.

The port of Chornomorsk was hit at the same time.

RiskIntelligence

Port of Chornomorsk hit in Russian attack

januar 7 2026

Region: Europe

The port of Chornomorsk, Ukraine, was hit in a Russian attack at an unknown time on 07 January 2026.

According to local sources, the port was hit in a combined missile and drone strike causing possible one fatalities and unknown damage to port infrastructure.

Port of Pivdenny was reportedly hit at the same time.

RiskIntelligence

Port of Izmail hit in drone attack

januar 1 2026

Region: Europe

The port of Izmail, Ukraine was hit in a Russian drone attack at an unknown time on 01 January 2026.

According to local authorities on social media, port infrastructure was damaged, but no injuries are reported. There are no reports of vessels damaged either.

There are also unconfirmed reports that either Odesa or Chornomorsk may have been hit as well.

Port reportedly targeted in UAV attack

december 30 2025

Region: Europe

A drone attack reportedly targeted and damaged port facilities at Tuapse, Russia at an unknown time on 30 December 2025.

Local officials said that the "port's berth" had been damaged. A nearby gas pipeline was also damaged. Emergency crews were dispatched to repair the damage. No injuries were reported.

RiskIntelligence

Bulk carrier CAPTAIN KARAM struck by UAV while underway

december 30 2025

Region: Europe

The Panama-flagged bulk carrier CAPTAIN KARAM was attacked by one or more Russian unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) at 14:26 LT (11:26 UTC) on 30 December 2025 whilst underway in the northern Black Sea near the Sulina Canal East Anchorage. The vessel was en route to a Ukrainian port to load grain at the time of the attack.

The incident occurred at 45:07.1N 029:54.7E.

Photographs released by the Ukrainian Navy showed impact damage to the vessel's port side upper shell plating just forward of the accommodation block. There were no reports of injuries to the crew.

The 56,018 DWT vessel has LA Maritime S.A., Piraeus, Greece, as technical manager.

Port of Pivdenny reportedly hit in Russian drone strike

december 30 2025

Region: Europe

The port of Pivdenny (formerly known as Port of Yuzhny) near Odessa, Ukraine, was reportedly hit in a Russian drone strike at an unknown time on 30 December 2025.

The port of Chornomorsk was also reportedly attacked as part of a coordinated Russian attack on Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Odessa region.

Reports and images on social media indicate that the Panama-flagged bulk carriers CAPTAIN KARAM (IMO 9303039) and EMMAKRIS III (IMO 9218387) were damaged during Russian attacks on 30 December. The CAPTAIN KARAM was damaged whilst underway in the Northern Black Sea near the Sulina Canal East Anchorage. The EMMAKRIS III was damaged during the attack against Chornomorsk Port.

Port of Chornomorsk reportedly hit in Russian drone strike

december 30 2025

Region: Europe

The port of Chornomorsk near Odessa, Ukraine, was reportedly hit in a Russian drone strike at an unknown time on 30 December 2025.

The Panama-flagged EMMAKRIS III was reportedly damaged in the attack.

The Emmarkis III, was detained by Ukraine in July 2022. The Ukrainian authorities asserted that the 73,000-dwt vessel, which was built in 2000, was Russian-owned. A Ukrainian court ordered the seizure of the vessel, and as of 2024, they had begun searching for a manager for the ship. However, the Ukrainians reported in 2025 that the intention was to sell vessel to raise money for Ukraine.

The port of Pivdennyi was also reportedly attacked as part of a coordinated Russian attack on Ukrainian port infrastructure in the Odessa region on 30 December. The CAPTAIN KARAM was also damaged whilst underway in the Northern Black Sea near the Sulina Canal East Anchorage.

RiskIntelligence

Odesa regional ports targeted in drone strikes

december 26 2025

Region: Europe

Russian drones have damaged Odesa port infrastructure and vessels in a strike in the early morning hours of 26 December 2025.

The Kiper, Izmail, Odesa, and Mykolaiv ports were targeted.

The Russian strikes destroyed grain elevators as well as other port infrastructure. Slovak, Palau and Liberian-flagged vessels were also damaged in the drone strikes. There have been no fatalities reported, however, there were numerous power outages.

RiskIntelligence

Port of Temryuk targeted in military operation

december 25 2025

Region: Europe

The port of Temryuk, Russia, was targeted during a Ukrainian military operation during the night from 24 to 25 December 2025.

According to reports by local authorities, there was a fire in two oil product tanks following an attack with aerial drones. The port had already been attacked by the Ukrainian military on 5 December.

Ukrainian ports targeted in military operation

december 23 2025

Region: Europe

Several ports in Ukraine were targeted during a Russian military operation during the night from 22 to 23 December 2025.

As reported by Ukrainian officials, the Russian military carried out a "massive attack with drones" in the region south of Odesa. As a result, the Tanzania-flagged general cargo ship ANKA was damaged while alongside in the port of Reni. The vessel was under detention by Ukrainian authorities at the time of the attack.

In Odesa, a Lebanon-flagged bulk carrier was also damaged while alongside.

Damages to a port warehouse in Reni and to port facilities in Odesa were also reported. Additional targets included energy and transport infrastructure.

The 5000 DWT ANKA is under technical management by Sima Shipping, Istanbul, Türkiye.

RiskIntelligence

General cargo vessel YOUSSEF BEY damaged in Russian missile strike

december 23 2025

Region: Europe

The Lebanon-flagged general cargo vessel YOUSSEF BEY was damaged in a strike on the port of Odesa, Ukraine at an unknown time on 23 December 2025.

According to the reports there were no injuries for the crew of the vessel that were reportedly transporting soybeans at the time of the strike.

The 7,449 DWT vessel has Sea Logistics, Marshall Islands as technical managers.

General cargo vessel ANKA damaged during strike on port

december 23 2025

Region: Europe

The Tanzania-flagged general cargo vessel ANKA was damaged in a Russian strike on port of Reni, Ukraine at an unknown time on 23 December 2025.

According to the reports, the vessel, held under arrest by the authorities, suffered unknown damage in the strike.

The 5,000 DWT vessel has Sima Shipping, Turkey as technical managers.



Knowing Risk

Risk Intelligence A/S
Strandvejen 100
2900 Hellerup
Denmark

Tel: +45 7026 6230

www.riskintelligence.eu