



WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT | ISSUE NO. 22 (04 JUNE 2026)

# Black Sea (Ports and Terminals)



Risk Intelligence System  
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# About the report

This report provides an overview of the current maritime security situation in the Black Sea, particularly in the vicinity of specific ports and terminals in the northern part. It is primarily aimed at assessing the threat of security incidents affecting operations of merchant ships operating in this area.

Comprehensive descriptions for individual incidents as well as statistics about attacks against merchant ships are available on the Risk Intelligence System.

Time of latest intelligence included in this report:  
04 JUNE 2026, 08:00 UTC.

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# Overview of current situation

## Summary

- The current threat picture for the Black Sea remains unchanged.
- Maritime related incidents during the past week, include 5 merchant vessels, damaged during aerial attacks.
- Both Ukraine and Russia continued their strikes against energy and export infrastructure, in both countries.

## Brief update

This year's developments in the Russia–Ukraine war are likely the culmination of trends that have unfolded over previous years, albeit for different reasons on each side. The maritime incidents recorded over the past week reflect this trajectory and provide a useful illustration of how the conflict has evolved.

Incidents involving merchant vessels in Ukrainian waters, activity in the Russian-occupied port of Berdyansk, attacks on Russian-affiliated naval assets by Ukraine, and the reported discovery of a mine at sea all represent increasingly familiar features of the regional threat environment. The attacks involving commercial shipping underline Russia's continued ability to strike targets within Ukrainian territorial waters, while Ukraine's strategy of targeting Russia's oil sector and associated shipping in order to reduce export revenues was also evident in the past week's operations. In this context, Russia's recent large-scale strikes on Kyiv and other major cities were likely retaliatory. Similar attacks by both sides are likely to continue, as their strategic objectives remain unchanged and no mutually accepted or enforceable peace agreement appears imminent. The incidents also underscore the persistent danger posed by mines and mine-related objects in the Black Sea. In practice, the precise location of such incidents is of limited significance, as both Russian and Ukrainian forces retain the capability to operate across the wider Black Sea. As such, the latest incidents do not materially alter the overall threat picture; rather, strategically opportune circumstances are likely to remain the primary driver of targeting decisions, rather than specific locations.

There are currently no indications of new diplomatic talks being planned.

The current scenarios for vessel attacks are (order does not represent likelihood):

**Scenario 1:** The threat of damage to vessels in both Ukrainian and Russian ports, remains the most likely, due to the general targeting of ports and terminals by both sides. However, damage towards vessels transiting to both Ukrainian and Russian Black Sea ports, also remains likely.

**Scenario 2:** Vessels can be targeted due to flawed intelligence from the Russian military, suggesting they carry military hardware.

**Scenario 3:** Although vessels are not assessed to be targeted specifically based on their flag, owner etc., Russian attacks are likely aimed at deterring vessels and disrupting maritime exports by creating uncertainty and danger, and to increase pressure as part of influencing future negotiations.

**Scenario 4:** Ukraine may target vessels with ties to Moscow and the Russian military to increase pressure on the Russian economy aimed at deterring vessels and disrupting maritime exports by creating uncertainty and danger, and to increase pressure as part of influencing future negotiations.

Regardless of objectives, ports, terminals, and their supporting infrastructure remain likely targets, as part of Russia's ongoing war in Ukraine.

## Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor

Vessel traffic continued through the Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor over the reporting period.

The threat to vessels remains greater during Russian attacks on port infrastructure and port cities, as collateral damage may occur.

Direct targeting of vessels remains possible, but is not assessed as an established strategy by Russia, which instead focus strikes against Ukrainian civilian society and overall societal robustness. Although the threat during transit to and from Ukrainian ports is considered lower compared to the threat of damage to vessels in port, a general threat persists to vessels operating in the area.

The Ukrainian Black Sea corridor and ports operate under IMO Circular Letter 4748 and local guidance, though operational differences should be expected.

Operational disruptions such as power outages and air-raids or air-raid alarms remain likely, until security improves. An elevated threat to

maritime trade in the NW Black Sea and near the conflict area persists due to likely Russian actions against vessels and port infrastructure.

## Black Sea

Russian and Ukrainian operations continue to threaten commercial shipping and the Black Sea remains an active war zone; further incidents are likely, though risk varies by area. Ukraine is less likely to target non-‘shadow-fleet’ vessels (Kremlin-controlled shipping), including ships bound for Russian Black Sea ports, but misidentification, proximity to military activity, or shifts in political and economic pressure points could widen the target set, including after President Trump’s decision to pause sanctions on Russian energy exports. Russia may retaliate for Ukrainian attacks on shadow-fleet shipping, most likely striking Ukrainian drone production and support sites and port infrastructure; however, direct or indirect impacts on commercial vessels cannot be discounted. At sea, harassment, AIS/GPS jamming or spoofing, and warning shots remain plausible and could disrupt navigation and schedules even without physical damage.

Ukraine is expected to sustain pressure on Russian forces in the Black Sea, particularly around Crimea, to contest Russian freedom of manoeuvre and support shipping security; recent strikes on Russian naval assets in Sevastopol underline continuing intent and capability. Although Russia’s naval capability in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov has been reduced, it retains assets that could lay mines or deploy munitions, while submarine activity will remain constrained by Ukraine’s anti-ship capabilities and defensive measures.

Under current conditions, Russia is unlikely to re-establish a blockade or impose an inspection regime in the north-western Black Sea. The use of naval drones—surface and sub-surface—and aerial drones is likely to increase on both sides, raising the likelihood of vessels encountering unexploded devices downed by electronic warfare or crashing short of their targets; these may drift beyond combat areas on currents, creating intermittent hazards well away from the front line.

Mine-countermeasure operations by Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Ukraine continue, but operators should still anticipate disruption from regional naval activity, congestion at key straits and ports, sanctions-related constraints, and more difficult crew changes—pressures that have intensified since Russia withdrew from the UN-backed Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023.

## Sea of Azov

The Sea of Azov is largely restricted for commercial traffic without Russian consent. Mariupol and Berdyansk ports, controlled by Russian forces, have unclear operational statuses. Reports indicate stolen Ukrainian cargo is being transported from these ports.

Ukraine monitors vessels to occupied ports in the Sea of Azov and may consider them potential military targets.

Russia has increased defences around the Crimea bridge due to Ukrainian strikes. Non-Russian-flagged vessels can face disruption in the Kerch Strait, and Russia may prohibit vessels loaded outside its territory from transiting. Attacks on Russian Black Sea ports operating at ISPS level 2 are probable.

## Ukraine

Port information is located in the port table.

The direct targeting of vessels, as part of Russian attacks, remains possible, although collateral damage is the most likely threat to materialise. This is similar for all Ukrainian ports. Direct targeting is more likely to occur as part of retaliation following Ukrainian strikes on cargo vessels. Russian strikes on ports are likely to continue to occur, as well as against energy and logistics infrastructure.

Power-outages and air-raids continue throughout the country, which routinely disrupt port operations. Therefore, concerns regarding the operational future of the country's energy network, including sufficient supplies and making the network more resilient to aerial attacks remain a clear priority to Ukraine. Given the constant unpredictability, future disruption in ports due to lapses in energy supply should be expected.

Until any form of a ceasefire is agreed and enforced, Russia is likely to use any pretext for future attacks on Black Sea maritime operations, if deemed useful to achieve their military or political objectives.

Martial law remains in place with some local night-time curfews. All Ukrainian ports are operating at ISPS level 3 following the communication to the IMO by the Ukrainian authorities.

## Russia

Port information is located in the port table.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence recently reaffirmed its strategy to deny Russia the resources necessary to continue the war. A major focus of this strategy is countering the so-called "shadow fleet", which is used for transporting Russian oil and other energy products. This approach signals Ukraine's ongoing intention to carry out kinetic attacks against these vessels. With Russian exports increasingly coming under pressure, attacks on tankers and other ships headed for Russian waters remain probable during 2026.

Ukrainian targeting may extend beyond vessels under Russian control or affiliated with the Russian "shadow-fleet". Incidents at Novorossiysk in 2026 have demonstrated that ships involved in legal trade of Russian energy - including those compliant with sanctions and price caps - are

also possible targets. This includes vessels calling at the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) marine terminals. Attacks on tankers not aligned with Russia suggest a broader Ukrainian effort to deter activity in Russian waters and further restrict Russia's energy income. Ukrainian targeting of all energy export infrastructure in Western Russia and the Black Sea is likely to continue at high levels of intensity both in tempo and scope of attacks.

Although the United States has reportedly cautioned Ukraine against targeting the CPC terminal, it is unlikely that Kyiv will comply. The CPC mainly transports Kazakh oil, but its route passes through Russian territory, it is closely connected to Russian infrastructure, and includes substantial Russian ownership. These factors likely place the CPC terminal within Ukraine's broader campaign against Russian exports. Possible attacks could be directed at the onshore facility using aerial drones or at the offshore terminal using naval drones, most likely at night to minimise collateral damage. There is also the possibility of increased attacks on vessels operating in the area.

Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy export infrastructure across the Black Sea are likely to continue.

## Conflict outlook

So far, this year's developments in the Russia–Ukraine war reflect longer-term trends on both sides. Recent maritime incidents, including attacks on merchant vessels, activity in Berdyansk, Ukrainian attacks on Russian-affiliated naval movements, and the discovery of a mine at sea, are consistent with the established Black Sea threat environment. The incidents underline Russia's continued ability to strike within Ukrainian waters, while also reflecting Ukraine's efforts to target Russian oil exports and energy infrastructure, and reported stolen Ukrainian grain, to reduce war-critical revenues. Russia's recent large-scale strike on Kyiv was likely at least partly retaliatory. Mines and mine-related objects remain a persistent threat, and ports and other maritime related infrastructure remain vulnerable to future attacks, often due to available air-defence capabilities. There are currently no indications of new diplomatic talks. With both sides retaining the capability and willingness to continue the war, and with no enforceable peace agreement in sight, further reciprocal attacks remain highly likely.

### **Annex 1 – List of commercial vessel incidents**

### **Annex 2 – Recent incidents**

# Ukraine and northern Black Sea ports

| Port                        | Current port situation   | Current local situation  | Operations | Security |
|-----------------------------|--|--|------------|----------|
| <b>Odesa</b>                | The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.      | Russian strikes do occur against critical infrastructure in the Odesa Oblast, including some direct targeting of Odesa city and port. Future attacks targeting Odesa port cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms.    |            |          |
| <b>Pivdenny</b>             | The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.      | Russian strikes have occurred against targets in and near Pivdenny in the past, including targeting of the port. Future targeting in the area as part of military operations cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms. |            |          |
| <b>Mykolaiv</b>             | Closed. Cargo operations suspended for commercial operations.  | In control of Ukrainian forces. Russian strikes against military targets and critical-infrastructure targets in or near the city do occur.   |            |          |
| <b>Mariupol</b>             | Disputed operational status.   | Controlled by Russian forces and part of annexed territory. Actual operational status is disputed with Russian authorities reporting the port to be open, although this is with very limited traffic prioritized by the Russian state. Reports indicate the rebuilding of the port facilities by Russian military and contractors.   |            |          |
| <b>Chornomorsk</b>          | The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.      | Russian strikes have occurred against critical infrastructure in the Odessa Oblast. Future attacks targeting Chornomorsk port cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms.  |            |          |
| <b>Ukraine Danube ports</b> | Ukraine Danube ports are operating and handling ship calls via the Danube, and the Sulina and Bystre Canals. | Incidents involving mines have occurred in the Black Sea near the canals. Russian strikes against the ports in the Izmil region, do occur. Local weather conditions, water levels, and pilot shortages also impact maritime operations. ISPS Level 3 is in place, as communicated by the Ukrainian authorities. Delays and congestion have been reported in relation to port and canal operations.                 |            |          |

\* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts.

\*\* Risk Intelligence is not responsible for third-party content.

| Port   | Current port situation  | Current local situation   | Operations | Security |
|--|---|---|------------|----------|
| <b>Kerch Strait</b>                                | Open for navigation but only for authorized transit. Ports located within the Strait are reported to be operating. Inspection regime and additional security measures are in place. | UKR naval drone or missile strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge and nearby naval stations and critical infrastructure remain possible. Strikes on commercial traffic is possible. Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Russia has announced transit restriction of vessels which are not loaded in Russian ports. Scrutiny against crew is possible *. See Annex 3 for reported Kerch Strait inspection area. |            |          |
| <b>Russian Black Sea ports</b>                     | Open with restrictions. Additional security measures are in place.  | Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, merchant vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones, aerial drones, or cruise missiles, is possible. Collateral damage from drones may occur in case of incidents, and Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Scrutiny against crew is possible *.                       |            |          |
| <b>Russian Sea of Azov ports</b>                   | Open with restrictions. Sea of Azov is currently closed to unauthorized navigation by the Russian authorities. Additional security measures are in place.                           | Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, merchant vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones, aerial drones or cruise missiles, is possible. Collateral damage from drones may occur in case of incidents, and Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Scrutiny against crew is possible *.                        |            |          |
| <b>Temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports</b> | Operational status is reported to be open, in accordance with IMO Circular Letter 4748 – though likely influenced by local operational circumstances in the NW Black Sea.           | The corridor is reported to be running without considerable issues, although disruption following attacks are to be expected. Any tacit agreement from Russia on current transits are unknown, and further Russian acceptance is unclear if the increased tempo of Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in the Black Sea continues. Military activity in and near the corridor is possible, collateral damage to vessels is possible.          |            |          |
| <b>Constanta</b>                                   | Open.   | Operating, with additional cargo diverted to Constanta due to closed Ukrainian ports. Congestion should be expected, and although this is being managed, it could lead to delays.   |            |          |

\* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts.

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# Operations and Security definitions

## Operations

**Green** – Operations in the area are ongoing normally with no significant issues.

**Yellow** – Some delays or disruptions in the area may be expected, which could be due to limitations to, for example, port operations and/or congestion in the area, or other difficulties with access or operating at the required ISPS level or complying with other procedures either at port or offshore.

**Red** – Operations have been significantly disrupted and ports or areas might be closed or only partially operating due to restrictions, blockades, lack of functioning infrastructure, personnel disruptions, and access concerns, or other issues preventing all or most operations.

## Security

**Green** – The area is secure and there are no direct or indirect security threats in the port vicinity or offshore area. Low threat to vessels/personnel.

**Yellow** – There are no direct security threats but there are possible indirect threats in the vicinity, particularly but not limited to conflict taking place in proximity either on land or offshore. Moderate threat to vessels/personnel.

**Red** – Direct threats are possible to the port or area and/or its immediate approaches, including collateral damage in the immediate area or direct attacks that could target infrastructure and vessels at berth/anchorages/underway. High threat to vessels/personnel.


## Note on sanctions and commercial restrictions

Sanctions and commercial restrictions are being imposed on Russia and continue to evolve, affecting business operations in complex legal ways. Measures target individuals, companies, and certain exports such as oil products. Restrictions also apply to specific nationalities engaging in activities, to payments in certain currencies or through certain institutions, and to Russia's import of dual-use items and technologies. Port entry bans for Russian vessels have been introduced in some countries, including the UK. The detailed scope of sanctions may affect chartering arrangements in unexpected ways depending on links to Russia. These issues, along with insurance considerations for operating in war risk areas, are not covered in this report and may require separate assessment to reduce exposure.

# Annex 1 – List of commercial vessel incidents

| <b>Date</b>  | <b>Name of ship</b> | <b>Type</b>    | <b>Flag</b>   |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------|---------------|
| 01 JUNE 2026 | LEONID PESTRIKOV    | General cargo  | Russia        |
| 01 JUNE 2026 | AQUA REGIA          | Bulk           | Panama        |
| 30 MAY 2026  | BLACKSEA STAR       | General cargo  | Liberia       |
| 29 MAY 2026  | LA GALITA           | Container      | Panama        |
| 29 MAY 2026  | ANT                 | General cargo  | Vanuatu       |
| 28 MAY 2026  | VELORA              | Crude oil      | Sierra Leone  |
| 27 MAY 2026  | JAMES II            | Crude oil      | Palau         |
| 23 MAY 2026  | CHRYSALIS           | Tanker         | Liberia       |
| 18 MAY 2026  | <i>Unknown</i>      | <i>Unknown</i> | Guinea Bissau |
| 18 MAY 2026  | <i>Unknown</i>      | <i>Unknown</i> | Panama        |

# Annex 2 – Recent Incidents



Map of recent incidents (Source: Risk Intelligence System)

## General cargo vessel ANT hit during UAV attack – May 29 2026

The Vanuatu-flagged general cargo vessel ANT was hit by an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) attack Off Odesa, Ukraine, at an unknown time on 29 May 2026. The vessel was hit by a UAV strike following her departure from a port in Ukraine's Odesa region en route to Turkey. The strike reportedly hit the ship's superstructure, causing a fire on board and injuring two crew members. Units from the Ukrainian Navy and the Maritime Search and Rescue Service responded, quickly containing the blaze. Navy boats evacuated the two injured sailors to a medical facility. The vessel was then towed into Odesa port. Two additional merchant vessels, a Comoros-flagged and a Panama-flagged, were allegedly also targeted in the incident.

## Containership LA GALITE struck – May 29 2026

A Panama-flagged containership, LA GALITE, was struck off Odessa, Ukraine, at an unknown time on 29 May 2026. The vessel was attacked by an unmanned drone and missile. It suffered structural damage to the starboard side in the accommodation block, rescue boat, and pertinent unit. No injuries were reported. The vessel shifted from the incident place to Varna anchorage under its own power and dropped anchor in the nominated anchorage area.

## Strike on port of Taganrog reported – May 30 2026

A drone strike was reported on the Port of Taganrog, Russia, at an unknown time on 30 May 2026. According to Ukrainian media reports, quoting official sources, a number of targets in the city was hit, including port facilities. There an unconfirmed report of a tanker also being hit or damaged in the operation.

**General cargo vessel BLACKSEA STAR struck – May 30 2026**

A Liberia-flagged general cargo vessel, BLACKSEA STAR, was struck in Taganrog, Russia, in the early morning on 30 May 2026. It was reported that the vessel sustained damage during a drone attack. The drone strike caused fires aboard the vessel, a nearby fuel storage tank, and an administrative building within the port perimeter. Emergency services responded and extinguished the fires. No fuel spill was reported.

**Bulk carrier AQUA REGIA struck in drone attack – June 1 2026**

The Panama-flagged bulk carrier AQUA REGIA was struck in a Russian drone attack at Odesa port, Ukraine at an unknown time on 01 June 2026. According to media reports the vessel was loading grain at Odesa port when it was struck by a drone, resulting in some hull damage. There are no reports of injuries.

**Ukraine forces attack general cargo vessel LEONID PESTRIKOV - June 1 2026**

The Ukrainian military reportedly attacked the Russian-flagged general cargo vessel LEONID PESTRIKOV with an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) at unknown time at the port of Berdiansk, Ukraine on 01 June 2026. The attack was confirmed by a press report. According to the statement, the vessel was struck by a UAV, following which the vessel suffered significant damage, no individuals were reported as being injured during the attack.

**Tug hit in UAV strike – June 2 2026**

A Russian Project 1454 Tug was hit in Mizhvodne, Occupied Crimea overnight 01-02 June 2026. The head of Ukraines Unmanned Systems Forces reported a number of incidents overnight 01-02 June 2026, which included two Pantsir air defence systems, a command post of the Russian 3rd Army Corps, and a Project 1454 Tug. Project 1454 Tugs were designed during the 1970s as Rescue vessels. The Pantsirs and the Tug were hit in occupied Crimea whilst the command port was located in Donetsk Oblast.

**YaRM-type mine discovered off Romanian coast – June 2 2026**

A YaRM-type anti-landing mine was discovered off the Bulgarian coast north of Vama Veche at an unknown time on 02 June 2026. The mine was approximately 0.2 nautical miles from shore and was detonated by special services on 03 June 2026.

**Russian Svetlyak-class patrol craft hit in UAV strike – June 4 2026**

A Russian Project 10410 Svetlyak-class patrol ship was reported hit off Yurkyne Crimea at an unknown time on 04 June 2026. Imagery released by the Unmanned Systems Forces indicates the vessel was hit on the Starboard side as she was underway. The vessels are primarily used in border patrol roles and are armed with guns and surface to air missiles for unit defence.



# Knowing Risk



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