



WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE REPORT | ISSUE NO. 33 (20 AUGUST 2026)

Black Sea (Ports and Terminals)



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About the report

This report provides an overview of the current maritime security situation in the Black Sea, particularly in the vicinity of specific ports and terminals in the northern part. It is primarily aimed at assessing the threat of security incidents affecting operations of merchant ships operating in this area.

Comprehensive descriptions for individual incidents as well as statistics about attacks against merchant ships are available on the Risk Intelligence System.

Time of latest intelligence included in this report:
20 AUGUST 2026, 08:00 UTC.

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Overview of current situation

Summary

- The current threat picture for the Black Sea is unchanged, as the area remains an active and high-intensity area of the wider conflict.
- The past week saw several bulk carriers damaged and attacked, in or near both Ukrainian and Russian Black Sea, grain export ports – as part of continued intensified military operations by both Russian and Ukrainian forces.
- No further diplomatic developments during the past week.

Brief update

The past week saw a high number of bulk carriers attacked or damaged during wider attacks by Russian and Ukrainian forces as part of military operations against both countries.

The past week's incidents in the Black Sea are notable for the increased involvement of bulk carriers. While such vessels have previously been targeted or damaged during wider attacks, recent incidents suggest a more deliberate campaign by both Russian and Ukrainian forces. This likely reflects the evolution of both countries' summer military campaigns, particularly Ukraine's. Targeting export economies appears intended to reduce revenue and, in turn, constrain each side's ability to sustain the war effort.

Ukraine initially focused on Russia's oil economy, including production and export facilities, reportedly affecting farmers' ability to harvest crops. It is now also targeting warehouse and distribution sites assessed to support Russia's military-industrial ecosystem. The recent strikes on Russian grain export facilities are therefore likely part of a broader Ukrainian effort to limit Russia's ability to export both its own grain and allegedly stolen Ukrainian grain from Black Sea ports.

Since Ukraine intensified operations against Russia in late June, initially described as a 40-day campaign but with some elements continuing, Russian forces have retaliated with large-scale attacks on Ukrainian civilian infrastructure, including ports and vessels supporting exports. Russia has had the capability to conduct such attacks since launching its full-scale invasion, but now appears under greater pressure to sustain them as Ukrainian strikes increasingly affect wider Russian society.

The current scenarios for vessel attacks are (order does not represent likelihood):

Scenario 1: The threat of damage to vessels in both Ukrainian and Russian ports, remains the highly likely, due to the general targeting of ports and terminals by both sides. However, damage towards vessels transiting to both Ukrainian and Russian Black Sea ports, also remains likely.

Scenario 2: Russia targets vessels due to flawed intelligence, suggesting they carry military hardware.

Scenario 3: Russia targets vessels to blockade Ukrainian ports. Although vessels are not assessed to be targeted specifically based on their flag, owner etc., Russian attacks are likely aimed at deterring vessels and disrupting maritime exports by creating uncertainty and danger, and to increase pressure as part of influencing future negotiations.

Scenario 4: Ukraine has proven willing to target vessels it considers assisting Russia with exports, with the stated aim to increase pressure on the Russian economy by deterring vessels and disrupting maritime exports by creating uncertainty and danger, and to increase pressure as part of influencing future negotiations.

Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor

Vessel traffic transiting the Ukrainian Black Sea Corridor during the reporting period, is likely remaining very limited.

Operational disruptions such as power outages and air-raids or air-raid alarms remain likely, until security improves. An elevated threat to maritime trade in the NW Black Sea and near the conflict area persists due to likely Russian actions against vessels and port infrastructure. The threat to vessels remains greater during Russian attacks on port infrastructure and port cities, as collateral damage remains likely as part of wider strikes against Ukrainian civilian society. Strikes carried out against vessels anchored in the northern end of the corridor, can occur. Russia continues to legitimise the strikes by claiming the vessels to be military transports. Previous incidents and reports indicate that some vessels attempt to leave Ukrainian ports during nighttime.

The Ukrainian Black Sea corridor and ports operate under IMO Circular Letter 4748 and local guidance, though operational differences should be expected.

Black Sea

Russian and Ukrainian military operations continue to threaten commercial shipping and the Black Sea remains an active war zone; further incidents are likely, though the threat varies by area. Ukraine is generally less likely to target non-‘shadow-fleet’ vessels (Kremlin-controlled or affiliated shipping), including ships bound for Russian Black Sea ports, but such incidents have occurred and future similar incidents cannot be ruled out. Vessel misidentification, proximity to military activity, or shifts in political and economic pressure points can further widen the target set.

Russia is likely to continue to retaliate for Ukrainian attacks on shadow-fleet shipping, most likely striking Ukrainian drone production and support sites and port infrastructure and, direct or indirect targeting of commercial vessels is also likely.

Aside from retaliation, Russia is likely continue to strike vessels to disrupt Ukrainian exports

At sea, harassment, AIS/GPS jamming or spoofing, and warning shots remain plausible and could disrupt navigation and schedules even without physical damage.

Ukraine is expected to sustain pressure on Russian forces in the Black Sea, particularly around Crimea, to contest Russian freedom of manoeuvre and support shipping security; recent strikes on Russian naval assets in Sevastopol underline continuing intent and capability. Although Russia’s naval capability in the Black Sea and Sea of Azov has been reduced, it retains assets that could lay mines or deploy munitions, while submarine activity will remain constrained by Ukraine’s anti-ship capabilities and defensive measures.

Under current conditions, Russia is unlikely to re-establish a physical blockade or impose an inspection regime in the north-western Black Sea. The use of naval drones—surface and sub-surface—and aerial drones is likely to increase on both sides, raising the likelihood of vessels encountering unexploded devices downed by electronic warfare or crashing short of their targets; these may drift beyond combat areas on currents, creating intermittent hazards well away from the front line.

Mine-countermeasure operations by Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey and Ukraine continue, but operators should still anticipate disruption from regional naval activity, congestion at key straits and ports, sanctions-related constraints, and more difficult crew changes—pressures that have intensified since Russia withdrew from the UN-backed Black Sea Grain Initiative in July 2023.

Sea of Azov

Russian and Ukrainian military operations continue to threaten commercial shipping and the Sea of Azov remains an active war zone; The Sea of Azov is largely restricted for commercial traffic without Russian consent. Mariupol and Berdyansk ports, controlled by Russian forces, have unclear operational statuses. Reports indicate stolen Ukrainian cargo is being transported from these ports.

Ukraine monitors vessels to occupied ports in the Sea of Azov and may consider them potential military targets – as proven by recent incidents.

Russia has increased defences around the Crimea bridge due to Ukrainian strikes. Non-Russian-flagged vessels can face disruption in the Kerch Strait, and Russia may prohibit vessels loaded outside its territory from transiting. Attacks on Russian Black Sea ports operating at ISPS level 2 are probable.

Ukraine

Port information is located in the port table.

The direct targeting of vessels, as part of Russian attacks, remains possible, although collateral damage is also likely. This is similar for all Ukrainian ports. Direct targeting is more likely to occur as part of retaliation following Ukrainian strikes on cargo vessels. Russian strikes on ports are likely to continue to occur, as well as against energy and logistics infrastructure.

Russia seems determined to disrupt vessel traffic to Ukraine to limit imports and exports. This is likely tied to the beginning of the Ukrainian harvest season, where large quantities of grains are normally shipped out of the Odesa ports. Even though no vessels are currently going in or out of Ukrainian Black Sea ports, Russia have resorted to striking dormant vessels in Mykolaiv, to maintain an image of a high-tempo of operations and to deter further traffic.

Power-outages and air-raids continue throughout the country, which routinely disrupt port operations. Therefore, concerns regarding the operational future of the country's energy network, including sufficient supplies and making the network more resilient to aerial attacks remain a clear priority to Ukraine. Given the constant unpredictability, future disruption in ports due to lapses in energy supply should be expected.

Until any form of a ceasefire is agreed and enforced, Russia is likely to use any pretext for future attacks on Black Sea maritime operations, if deemed useful to achieve their military or political objectives.

Martial law remains in place with some local night-time curfews. All Ukrainian ports are operating at ISPS level 3 following the communication to the IMO by the Ukrainian authorities.

Russia

Port information is located in the port table.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defence has reaffirmed its strategy of denying Russia the resources needed to sustain the war. A key focus is the so-called shadow fleet, used to transport Russian oil and other energy products. This signals Ukraine's continued willingness to conduct kinetic attacks against such vessels. As pressure on Russian exports increases, attacks on tankers and other ships heading for Russian waters remain probable in 2026.

Ukrainian targeting may also extend beyond Russian-controlled or shadow-fleet-linked vessels. Incidents at Novorossiysk in 2026 showed that ships involved in legal Russian energy trade, including those complying with sanctions and price caps, can also be at risk. This includes vessels calling at Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) marine terminals. Attacks on tankers not aligned with Russia suggest Kyiv is seeking to deter wider activity in Russian waters and further restrict Moscow's energy income.

Although the United States has cautioned Ukraine against targeting the CPC terminal, Kyiv is unlikely to comply fully. The CPC mainly transports Kazakh oil, it relies on Russian infrastructure and includes substantial Russian ownership. These links probably place the terminal within Ukraine's broader campaign against Russian exports. Future attacks could target the onshore facility with aerial drones or the offshore terminal with naval drones, most likely at night to reduce collateral damage. Increased attacks on vessels operating nearby are also possible. Overall, Ukrainian strikes against Russian energy export infrastructure in western Russia and across the Black Sea are likely to continue at a high tempo and with a broad target set.

Conflict outlook

There were no notable diplomatic developments over the past week, and ongoing efforts show no clear signs of progress. Russia and Ukraine are therefore likely to continue their current military approaches, with further Black Sea incidents possible in the coming week.

Recent Black Sea incidents suggest both Russia and Ukraine are increasingly focusing on bulk carriers and maritime related export infrastructure as part of wider efforts to weaken each other's war-sustaining economies. While such vessels have previously been damaged during broader attacks, recent activity points to a more deliberate campaign linked to the progression of both countries' summer military operations, particularly Ukraine's. Kyiv has expanded from targeting Russia's oil production and export facilities to striking warehouses, distribution sites and grain export infrastructure assessed to support Russia's military-industrial ecosystem. These attacks likely aim to restrict Russia's ability to export both its own grain and allegedly stolen Ukrainian grain from Black Sea ports. Russia has responded with

continued large-scale strikes on Ukrainian infrastructure, including ports and vessels linked to exports. Although Moscow has retained this capability since the start of its full-scale invasion, it now appears under increasing pressure to sustain such attacks as Ukrainian operations have a growing impact on wider Russian society.

Annex 1 – List of commercial vessel incidents

Annex 2 – Recent incidents

Ukraine and northern Black Sea ports

Port	Current port situation	Current local situation	Operations	Security
Odesa	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes do occur against critical infrastructure in the Odesa Oblast, including some direct targeting of Odesa city and port. Future attacks targeting Odesa port cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
Pivdenny	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes against targets in and near Pivdenny do occur, including targeting of the port. Future targeting in the area as part of military operations cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
Mykolaiv	Closed. Cargo operations suspended for commercial operations.	In control of Ukrainian forces. Russian strikes against military targets and critical-infrastructure targets in or near the city do occur.		
Mariupol	Disputed operational status.	Controlled by Russian forces and part of annexed territory. Actual operational status is disputed with Russian authorities reporting the port to be open, although this is with very limited traffic prioritized by the Russian state. Reports indicate the rebuilding of the port facilities by Russian military and contractors.		
Chornomorsk	The port is understood operational in accordance with the IMO Circular Letter 4748, and local guidance.	Russian strikes occur against critical infrastructure in the Odessa Oblast. Future attacks targeting Chornomorsk port cannot be ruled out. The overall security situation remains highly unpredictable and local operational differences and issues should be expected. Disruptions to operations occurs regularly due to power outages or air raid alarms.		
Ukraine Danube ports	Ukraine Danube ports are operating and handling ship calls via the Danube, and the Sulina and Bystre Canals.	Incidents involving mines in the Black Sea near the canals. Russian strikes against the ports in the Izmail region, do occur. Local weather conditions, water levels, and pilot shortages also impact maritime operations. ISPS Level 3 is in place, as communicated by the Ukrainian authorities. Delays and congestion have been reported in relation to port and canal operations.		

* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts.

** Risk Intelligence is not responsible for third-party content.

Port	Current port situation	Current local situation	Operations	Security
Kerch Strait	Open for navigation but only for authorized transit. Ports located within the Strait are reported to be operating. Inspection regime and additional security measures are in place.	UKR naval drone or missile strikes against the Kerch Strait Bridge and nearby naval stations and critical infrastructure remain possible. Strikes on commercial traffic is possible. Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Russia has announced transit restriction of vessels which are not loaded in Russian ports. Scrutiny against crew is possible *. See Annex 3 for reported Kerch Strait inspection area.		
Russian Black Sea ports	Operating with local restrictions, including temporary closures. Additional security measures are in place.	Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, merchant vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones, aerial drones, or cruise missiles, is possible. Collateral damage from drones may occur in case of incidents, and Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Scrutiny against crew is possible *.		
Russian Sea of Azov ports	Operating with local restrictions, including temporary closures. Sea of Azov is currently closed to unauthorized navigation by the Russian authorities. Additional security measures are in place.	Ports operating at ISPS level 2, some operational delays possible. Ukrainian attacks against naval or state-affiliated vessels, merchant vessels, and port infrastructure, using naval drones, aerial drones or cruise missiles, is possible. Collateral damage from drones may occur in case of incidents, and Russian defensive fire against drones may hit commercial traffic. Scrutiny against crew is possible *.		
Temporary corridor from UKR Black Sea ports	Operational status is reported to be open, in accordance with IMO Circular Letter 4748 – though likely influenced by local operational circumstances in the NW Black Sea.	The corridor is reported to be open for navigation, although disruption following attacks are to be expected. Russia remains capable of targeting vessels in the corridor, and it is likely that the increased tempo of Ukrainian strikes on Russian assets in the Black Sea will also increase Russian strikes on Ukrainian assets and vessels in transit. Military activity in and near the corridor is remains possible and collateral damage to vessels is likely.		
Constanta	Open.	Operating, with additional cargo diverted to Constanta due to closed Ukrainian ports. Congestion should be expected, and although this is being managed, it could lead to delays.		

* Constraints and demands related to vessels with Ukrainian crewmembers. Russian crew with previous military service may be questioned by authorities withheld as part of Russian mobilization efforts.

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Operations and Security definitions

Operations

Green – Operations in the area are ongoing normally with no significant issues.

Yellow – Some delays or disruptions in the area may be expected, which could be due to limitations to, for example, port operations and/or congestion in the area, or other difficulties with access or operating at the required ISPS level or complying with other procedures either at port or offshore.

Red – Operations have been significantly disrupted and ports or areas might be closed or only partially operating due to restrictions, blockades, lack of functioning infrastructure, personnel disruptions, and access concerns, or other issues preventing all or most operations.

Security

Green – The area is secure and there are no direct or indirect security threats in the port vicinity or offshore area. Low threat to vessels/personnel.

Yellow – There are no direct security threats but there are possible indirect threats in the vicinity, particularly but not limited to conflict taking place in proximity either on land or offshore. Moderate threat to vessels/personnel.

Red – Direct threats are possible to the port or area and/or its immediate approaches, including collateral damage in the immediate area or direct attacks that could target infrastructure and vessels at berth/anchorages/underway. High threat to vessels/personnel.

Note on sanctions and commercial restrictions


Sanctions and commercial restrictions are being imposed on Russia and continue to evolve, affecting business operations in complex legal ways. Measures target individuals, companies, and certain exports such as oil products. Restrictions also apply to specific nationalities engaging in activities, to payments in certain currencies or through certain institutions, and to Russia's import of dual-use items and technologies. Port entry bans for Russian vessels have been introduced in some countries, including the UK. The detailed scope of sanctions may affect chartering arrangements in unexpected ways depending on links to Russia. These issues, along with insurance considerations for operating in war risk areas, are not covered in this report and may require separate assessment to reduce exposure.

Annex 1 – List of commercial vessel incidents

Date	Name of ship	Type	Flag
18 AUGUST 2026	ANTONIA S	Bulk	Liberia
18 AUGUST 2026	TQ TRABZON	General cargo	Vanuatu
18 AUGUST 2026	VICTORIA V	Bulk	Russia
18 August 2026	NECIBE	Bulk	San Marino
18 August 2026	ELINA B	Bulk	Malta
17 August 2026	ANNA S	Bulk	Liberia
17 August 2026	FEHU	Bulk	Marshall Islands
16 August 2026	SKIROS	Tanker	Liberia
13 August 2026	PRIMA	General cargo	Vanuatu
13 August 2026	T MOON	General cargo	Panama
13 August 2026	SEA LINE	General cargo	Portugal

(Additional vessel incidents are known, but vessels were not identified by the time of the publication of this report)

Annex 2 – Recent Incidents



Map of recent incidents (Source: Risk Intelligence System)

General cargo vessel SEA LINE struck by drone – August 13 2026

The Portugal-flagged general cargo ship SEA LINE was struck by a drone on the Danube River near Reni, Ukraine, on 13 August 2026. The precise time of the incident was not reported. The attack caused structural damage and a small fire, which was extinguished by the crew with assistance from Ukrainian authorities. No crew members were injured, and no flooding or pollution was reported. The vessel remained in the Reni area pending inspections and further instructions.

General cargo vessel T MOON struck by drone – August 13 2026

The Panama-flagged general cargo ship T MOON was struck by a drone before departing Reni, Ukraine, at an unknown time on 13 August 2026. The vessel sustained structural damage to its forward section, including the forecastle deck, windlass, mooring equipment, forecastle manoeuvring station, stores and the forward section of No. 1 cargo hold. A small fire broke out but was extinguished by the crew. No crew members were injured, and no pollution or water ingress was reported. The vessel remained at Reni pending inspections and further instructions.

General cargo vessel PRIMA damaged in missile/drone attack – August 13 2026

The Vanuatu-flagged general cargo vessel PRIMA was damaged in a missile/drone attack off Novorossysk, Russia at an unknown time on 13 August 2026. The vessel sustained some structural damage but was able to navigate under its own power. There are no reports of injuries.

Drone shot down by NATO aircraft over Romania – August 16 2026

An unknown drone was downed by NATO aircraft at an unknown position over Romania at an unknown time on 16 August 2026. According to NATO air command on X two Spanish F-18 fighters intercepted and downed the unidentified drone.

2 Tankers reportedly struck at Odesa – August 16 2026

An unidentified tanker was reportedly struck by a Russian attack drone at the Port of Odesa, Ukraine, at an unknown time on 16 August 2026. The precise location within the port was not reported. The Russian Ministry of Defence claimed that the vessel was being used to deliver fuel to Ukrainian forces. It was reported that attack drones struck a total of six vessel, four dry cargo vessels and two tankers. Ukraine had not confirmed the strike.

Naval facility reported hit in Russian attack – August 16 2026

An alleged naval facility in Bilhorod-Dnistrovskiy, Ukraine, was targeted in a drone strike at an unknown time on 16 August 2026. According to Russian sources the targeted facility was used for production of drone boats.

Crude oil tanker SKIROS hit in drone strike – August 16 2026

The Liberia-flagged crude oil tanker SKIROS was hit in a drone strike at Novorossiysk, Russia at an unknown time on 16 August 2026. According to the report the vessel had finished loading crude oil at the CPC terminal when it was hit in the bridge area by an aerial drone. There was a small fire that the crew were able to contain. No injuries were reported. Subsequent reporting cast doubt on the origin of the cargo and loading location. AIS tracks show erroneous positions throughout the tanker's port call.

Port of Izmail struck in Russian attack – August 17 2026

The Port of Izmail, Ukraine, was hit in a Russian drone attack at an unknown time on 17 August 2026. According to Ukrainian sources port infrastructure was damaged to an unknown degree by the attack. There are no reports of injuries.

Merchant vessel hit in attack – August 17 2026

A Togo-flagged merchant vessel was damaged in an attack near Port of Izmail, Ukraine, at an unknown time on 17 August 2026. According to Ukrainian sources four people were injured, three were hospitalized.

Bulk carrier targeted in drone attack – August 17 2026

An unknown bulk carrier was reported targeted at an unknown position near Odesa at an unknown time on 17 August 2026. According to a Russian source the vessel was targeted in, or near, Odesa.

2 Merchant vessels possibly attacked by drone – August 17 2026

An unknown merchant vessel has possibly been attacked by a drone at an unknown position in Odesa Ukraine at an unknown time on 17 August 2026. According to unconfirmed Russian reports the vessel was targeted in a drone attack.

Naval facility reportedly targeted – August 17 2026

A Ukrainian naval facility was reportedly targeted at Vylkove, Ukraine at an unknown time on 17 August 2026. According to unconfirmed Russian reports the naval facility was targeted.

Bulk carrier FEHU hit in drone attack – August 17 2026

The Marshall Islands-flagged bulk carrier FEHU was hit by drone attacks in the Black Sea en route to Novorossiysk, Russia at an unknown time on 17 August 2026. According to the reports the vessels suffered extensive damage as the accommodation was hit by several drones. An unknown number of crewmembers were injured to an unknown degree. The bridge suffered fire damage as well and the vessel lost its ability to navigate.

Bulk carrier ANNA S hit in drone strike – August 17 2026

The Liberia-flagged bulk carrier ANNA S was hit by drone strikes S of Novorossiysk, Russia at an unknown time on 17 August 2026. The vessel was hit by up to five drones and suffered serious damage and a fire. All 21 crew were rescued by the nearby ELINA B.

Suspected Russian missile/drone explodes near Tălmaza – August 17 2026

A suspected Russian missile/drone came down and exploded approximately 3 km from Tălmaza, Moldova, at 18:28 LT (15:28 UTC) on 17 August 2026. The precise location was not reported. The explosion caused a vegetation fire, which emergency services extinguished. No casualties were reported and no vessels were involved or affected. Authorities secured the area and deployed technical and explosives specialists to examine the wreckage and establish the object's origin. RI Note: Ukraine's Air Force identified the object as a Russian S8000 Banderol drone. Moldovan authorities have confirmed the airspace violation, crash and explosion but have not confirmed the object's type or origin.

Bulk carrier ELINA B hit by drones – August 18 2026

A Malta-flagged bulk carrier ELINA B was struck by two drones in the Black Sea off Novorossiysk, Russia, during the morning of 18 August 2026. The vessel had reportedly loaded approximately 56,000 tonnes of wheat at Novorossiysk and was proceeding towards the Bosphorus when attacked. Earlier, ELINA B had reportedly rescued the 21 crew members of bulk carrier ANNA S, which had been damaged in a drone attack on the evening of 17 August. About five hours after the rescue, two drones reportedly struck ELINA B. One drone was reported to have circled the vessel before impact. The extent of the damage was not disclosed and no casualties were reported. Despite the reported strikes, ELINA B continued its journey towards Türkiye.

Bulk carrier NECIBE hit in drone attack – August 18 2026

The San Marine-flagged bulk carrier was reported hit in a drone attack in the port of Tuapse, Russia at an unknown time on 18 August 2026. According to Ukrainian sources the vessel was loading wheat when it was targeted.

Bulk carrier VICTORIA V hit in drone attack – August 18 2026

The Russia-flagged bulk carrier VICTORIA V was hit in a drone attack in the port of Novorossiysk, Russia, at an unknown time on 18 August 2026. According to Ukrainian sources the vessel was scheduled to load grain when it was targeted.

General cargo vessel TQ TRABZON suffers drone attack – August 18 2026

The Vanuatu-flagged general cargo vessel TQ TRABZON was attacked in the Black Sea at an unknown time on 18 August 2026. The vessel, en route to Tuapse, Russia, was assisting a previously attacked vessel when it was subject to an attack. The vessel returned to Turkish waters after suffering an unknown extent of damage.

Bulk carrier ANTONIA S struck by projectile – August 18 2026

The Liberian-flagged bulk carrier ANTONIA S was struck by a UAV in the port of Chornomorsk, Ukraine, at an unknown time on 18 August 2026. The vessel was likely alongside the port when it was struck by the drone. Video footage taken from the port seems to show the vessel at berth with smoke exiting the starboard side of the vessel.



Knowing Risk



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